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BANKRUPTCY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES
AND THE LIMITS OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS
CHRISTOPHER

W. FROST*

Business failure negatively affects a broad range of interests,
yet the bankruptcy process directly protects only a small segment
of interest-holders: the creditors. Some commentators argue for
expansion of thatprotectionto encompassredistributivenorms and
provide for the interests of non-investors in the failed business.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994"s establishment of a national
commission to study the bankruptcyprocess and its broaderpolicy
implications brings with it the opportunity to consider that
redistributiveargument andperhaps change the process to include
the interests of non-investors under the reorganizationumbrella.
In this Article, ProfessorFrostresponds to those who would have
the bankruptcy reorganizationprocessprotectthe interests of noninvestors in the failed enterprise. The author outlines the
arguments bothfor and againstsuch protection,and concludes that
the bankruptcy process is institutionally incapable of achieving
redistributive goals. This process-oriented view of business
reorganizations holds that protection of non-investor interests
should be left to those institutions and processes capable of
competently providing it.
INTRODUCTION

Business failure is an essential function of any economic system.
It is necessary to what Schumpeter described as the process of
"creative destruction," through which capitalist economies grow
through a continual process of innovation and resulting obsolescence.' Schumpeter's basic insight into the dynamic evolution of the
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and Douglas Williams for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Matthew
Schroeder and Kevin Williams for their able research assistance.
1. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942).
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economy may have as much resonance today as when he coined the
phrase. Rapid changes in information technology, increasing
globalization of trade, changes in management technology, reductions
in regulation, and the privatization occurring in formerly socialist
states have caused a restructuring of business radical enough to lead
Jensen to describe it as a "Third Industrial Revolution."2
The darker side of the process shows in the displacement that
accompanies the death of businesses as they are creatively destroyed.
Technological change has not only made possible products and
manufacturing and distribution methods inconceivable 50 or 100 years
ago; it has also eliminated or substantially reduced the demand for a
wide range of products and services. Entire industries struggle to
adapt to new products or new methods of providing services. Take
the retail industry as an example. In his 1942 book, Schumpeter
noted the demise of small independent retailers caused by the rise of
the department store Today, retailing giants struggle to meet the
challenge of competition from discount stores that utilize new4
technologies to increase the efficiency of their distribution networks.
While a number of firms succeed in meeting the challenge of the
gales of creative destruction, many others fail. The late 1980s
witnessed a dramatic increase in business failures' and bankruptcies.6
Accompanying this rise was an ever-increasing focus on the social
problems caused by economic adjustments. Business failure affects
radically diverse interests-the interests of the creditor in being paid,
the interest of the shareholder in maintaining her residual claim to the
earnings of the business, the interest of the employee in retaining her
source of income, and the interests of the surrounding community in
maintaining an institution that provides numerous indirect benefits.
The toll that business failure exacts on dependent constituencies goes
beyond job loss and creditor recovery statistics. The closing of a
failed business may produce shock waves that reverberate throughout
the local, regional or national economy.
The search for a solution to the social problems accompanying
business failure has influenced debates surrounding corporate law and
governmental response to the problems of failure for years. In the
2. Michael C. Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
InternalControl Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 835 (1993).
3. SCHUMPETER, supra note 1, at 85.
4. Carol J. Loomis, Dinosaurs,FORTUNE, May 3, 1993, at 36.
5. See 1994 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT tbl. B-95, at 378.
6. 1991 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE UNITED STATES

CrS. tbl. 13, at 104 (bankruptcy cases 1981-1991).
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late 1970s and early 1980s, the focus of the debate was on plant
closings7 and governmental bailouts.8 More recently, the controversy
surrounded the displacement accompanying the so-called "two-tiered
bust-up hostile takeover."9 Today the social palliative of choice may
be shifting toward the bankruptcy reorganization process.
This Article responds to those who would ask the bankruptcy
system to protect the interests of non-investors. The bankruptcy
process is institutionally incapable of resolving the loss distribution
issues among all who are interested in the outcome of the case. Even
assuming that the social costs accompanying business failure should
be spread over a broad base, the judicial system is particularly illequipped to make the types of judgments required to distribute losses
in a way that bears any resemblance to rational policy.
The Bankruptcy Code" (the "Code") provides two alternatives
for distressed businesses. Chapter 7 of the Code provides a judicially
supervised liquidation of the business assets, with the proceeds going
to its investors. Chapter 11 provides a reorganization mechanism
under which the business may continue operating while restructuring
the investor claims against its assets. After these claims are adjusted
to reflect the value of the business as an ongoing entity, the business
emerges from bankruptcy protection to begin life anew.
Over the past several years, dissatisfaction with the Chapter 11
process has grown in both the academic community and the popular
press. As a result of repeated calls for bankruptcy reform, on
October 22, 1994, President Clinton signed the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994.11 Among its provisions is one for the creation of a
commission to study bankruptcy laws.'2 The last such commission
was formed in the early 1970s and led to wholesale changes in the
bankruptcy process. In his statement upon signing the 1994 Act,
President Clinton charged the commission with a review of the broad
policy implications of the bankruptcy process-including the effect of

7. See, e.g., Richard B. McKenzie, The Casefor Plant Closings, in PLANT CLOSINGS:
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES 205 (Richard B. McKenzie ed., 1984) (analyzing the
National Employment Priorities Act of 1979).
8. See, eg., Robert B. Reich, Bailout: A ComparativeStudy in Law and Industrial
Structure, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 163, 191-97 (1985) (tracing congressional debate over the
United States' loan guarantee for the Chrysler Corporation).
9. See 131 CONG. REC. 8812 (1985) (statement of Martin Lipton).
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
11. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
12. I& §§ 601-10, 108 Stat. at 4147-50.
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the process on individual communities. 3 In addition, the National
Economic Council is conducting a study of bankruptcy laws, including
an analysis of the
effects of increasing the representation of the
"public interest."' 4 Adding to the pressure for far-reaching change
of the bankruptcy laws is the fact that dissatisfaction with the process
comes at a time when the country (or at least the executive branch)
seems particularly reform-minded."
Most bankruptcy reform proposals respond to claims that the
Chapter 11 process is an inefficient means of debt collection.
Commentators advocating changes in the process generally see
bankruptcy as a device intended solely to maximize the economic
value of the estate for the benefit of its creditors. Under this
narrowly tailored economic approach, Chapter 11 is believed to fare
poorly in comparison to various market-oriented solutions.
A growing number of commentators have observed that this
economic approach to bankruptcy analysis fails to address the very
real concerns facing those who have come to depend on the continued
existence of the business. While employees, communities, and other
business dependents may not have traditional claims, the failure of
businesses nevertheless implicates their interests. Thus, an analysis of
the reorganization process that excludes the interests of these
constituencies is too narrow. On this view reorganization can only be
understood as a broadly inclusive mechanism of social policy intended
to distribute the social costs of business failure.
This debate is implicated in what is perhaps the most significant
issue addressed by the bankruptcy process-whether the assets of the
failed business should continue to be used in their pre-bankruptcy
configuration or liquidated in whole or in part. Chapter 11 is
premised on the notion that keeping the assets together will result in
an increase in value over that obtainable in a liquidation. Rarely will
this answer to the asset deployment issue be so clear cut, however.
Some businesses fail simply because they are obsolete or operate in

13. 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2129 (Oct. 22, 1994).
14. DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA) Jan. 17, 1994 (statement of Secretary of
Transportation Pena).
15. In the words of one commentator:
[T]he Clintonites are indeed focused-on everything. They are policy omnivores.
From rural-electrification non-recourse loans to the perks of Federal Home Loan
Bank Board Examiners, from the depreciated value of a privately owned

photocopier to the proper cost of a hysterectomy, nothing in American life is
exempt from the expert hand of Harvard technocracy.

Andrew Ferguson, Invasion of the Policy Wonks, WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 1993, at 34, 37.
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industries suffering from overcapacity. Others fail because of purely
financial problems, such as excessive debt service or managerial
failure. Those asking asset deployment questions must consider the
possibility that the failure was caused by fundamental problems that
cannot be remedied. Even assuming that some aspects of the business
are viable, the inquiry must further consider the liquidation of parts
of the business.
Such asset deployment questions involve a wide range of
assumptions regarding future and counter-factual data. Decisionmakers must consider not only the causes of the financial disaster and
the likelihood that remedial measures will reverse the problems, but
must also consider the economic value of a range of options, including
liquidation. Even in hindsight, it will often be unclear whether the
option chosen was the best among the wide range available. Thus, in
a world of uncertainty, particular asset deployment decisions cannot
be characterized as "correct" or "maximizing." It makes sense to
discuss asset deployment issues only in terms of the process through
which such decisions are made.
This process-oriented view of asset deployment issues gives
substance to the debate over the appropriate role of the reorganization process. To the extent the Chapter 11 process is intended
to serve the interests of investors in the failed enterprise, the process
through which asset deployment decisions are made should locate
decision-making power in the hands of those holding incentives to
maximize economic value. Investors who stand to gain or lose from
a particular decision are more likely to find and pursue the asset
maximizing strategy than is a decisionmaker, such as a judge, who has
no assets at stake in the outcome.
If this group of investors believes that the best course of action
is to attempt a reorganization, there will be little tension between the
investors and the non-investor16 constituencies. If, on the other
hand, the investors choose liquidation, their desires will conflict

16. The use of the term non-investor is a matter of convenience to denote those
groups without a non-bankruptcy "right to payment." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994)
(defining "claim" broadly as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured"). Of course, employees may be
investors in the sense that they have rights to payment under employment contracts or
based on other legal rights. Likewise, communities affected by the bankruptcy of a firm
may have rights to payment. This Article does not question the rights of these groups as
investors. Instead the question raised here is whether the bankruptcy process should grant
these groups rights based on something besides their "investor" status.
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directly with the non-investors who stand to lose jobs, taxes, customers and sources of supply. If the bankruptcy system is designed
to serve the interests of investors, this process approach dictates that
the company should be liquidated. If however, bankruptcy is
intended to serve some broader constituency, decisionmaking
authority might be relocated to a decisionmaker who is more likely
to delay the liquidation option.
Such delay works to the advantage of non-investors because they
stand to gain from the prolonged operation of the enterprise but bear
none of its costs. The delay imposes costs on the investors because
they are forced to continue an investment in which they see little
hope of success. In this sense, and against a backdrop of contractual
rules that provide investors a right to determine the fate of the firm,
bankruptcy protection for non-investors might be fairly characterized
as fulfilling some redistributive policy.
Most economic theorists dismiss the desirability of a redistributive
reorganization process with little more than a passing reference. For
the most part, proposals for reform of the bankruptcy laws have
started from the perspective that bankruptcy exists only to provide a
collection mechanism for creditors. The failing of this view is not that
it comes out in the wrong place, but rather that its advocates have
done little to respond to those urging a broader view of bankruptcy's
role.
A response is not only possible but necessary. The establishment
of a review commission presents an opportunity for a wide-ranging
review of the bankruptcy process that could lead to a substantial
change in the way we view its goals. An approach to bankruptcy that
focuses on the social problems accompanying financial failure requires
that we consider the institutional capabilities of the system. For the
most part, the bankruptcy debate has revolved around the issue of the
trade-off between allocative efficiency and broader goals of equity and
justice. What has been missing from the debate is an analysis of the
system's ability to determine who ultimately bears the cost of
redistributive policies.
This Article examines the problem of determining the incidence
of redistributive cost in the bankruptcy system. The claim here is not
that the bankruptcy process is an administratively expensive method
of pursuing redistributive policies. Neither does this Article claim
that such policies create intolerable social costs by introducing
allocative inefficiencies into the free market economy. Instead, the
focus here is on the practical problem of fitting means to ends.
Concluding that non-investors should be afforded some relief from the
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most devastating effects of financial failure is only the beginning of
the inquiry. A rational bankruptcy policy must ensure both that such
relief goes to those in need and that its costs are not borne by those
least able to pay. This Article demonstrates that the bankruptcy
process specifically and the judicial process generally are poorly
designed to render informed and rational judgments on these
questions.
Section I sets the stage by examining the academic debate over
the appropriate function of bankruptcy law, illustrating the inadequacy of the economic theorists' response to the concerns raised by
commentators seeking an expanded role for the process. Section II
analyzes the method through which Chapter 11 of the Code attempts
to fulfill redistributive policies and demonstrates the ways in which
the structure of the process is ill-suited to meeting those goals.
Section III explores the normative goals underlying calls for a
redistributive bankruptcy policy and demonstrates the importance of
understanding who will bear the cost of the redistributive policies.
Section IV examines the information problems that are likely to
accompany bankruptcy redistributions and that bear on the question
of cost spreading identified in Section III. Finally, Section V
examines the structure of the bankruptcy judicial process and the
difficulties its judges will encounter in attempting to redistribute the
costs of business failure.
I.

BANKRUPTCY THEORY AND THE INCLUSION OF NONINVESTOR INTERESTS

Over the past several years, dissatisfaction with the Chapter 11
reorganization process has increased, resulting in a number of
proposals for its reform or repeal.'
Contemporary bankruptcy
commentary, while diverse, can be divided roughly into two camps.
17. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
439 (1992) [hereinafter Adler, Risk Allocation]; Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political
Theories of American CorporateBankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993) [hereinafter
Adler, Financial and Political Theories]; Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of
Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy
Case for CorporateReorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird,
Uneasy Case];Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to CorporateReorganizations,101
HARV. L. REv. 775 (1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A
Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51 (1992) [hereinafter
Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice]; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for
CorporateReorganization,83 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking
the Line Between CorporateLaw and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994).

82
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One group of commentators sees bankruptcy as a device narrowly
designed to maximize creditor returns 8 while another group sees the
process as an opportunity to address the vast range of social problems
caused by business failure."
This section examines the debate
surrounding the role of Chapter 11 in addressing social problems.
By far the most influential approach to bankruptcy law has been
the creditors' bargain model developed by Baird and Jackson.' In
the creditors' bargain model, Baird and Jackson view bankruptcy

against the backdrop of non-bankruptcy debt collection rules,
justifying the process by a perceived need to overcome the collective
action problems inherent in state law systems." In Baird and
Jackson's account, creditors of financially troubled firms, if left to
their own devices, would engage in a destructive race under nonbankruptcy collection law that would result in the piecemeal
liquidation of the business.' Bankruptcy's automatic stay stops the

18. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 5 (1986)
[hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS]; Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 17, at 53;
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditorsin
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 101-03 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Adequate
Protection];Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 17, at 1045; Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice,
supra note 17, at 53.
19. See David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors'Bargain,61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 453,475-78 (1992) [hereinafter Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory]; Karen Gross, Taking
Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031
(1994); Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541, 545-47 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, Contractarianism];Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 766-68 (1991) [hereinafter Korobkin, Jurisprudence];Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 352-60
(1993) [hereinafter Warren, Imperfect World]; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy,54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775, 785-89 (1987) [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy].
20. The creditors' bargain model has spawned a vast amount of literature. The
contours of the argument can be gleaned from JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note
18; Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss Distribution];Baird,
Uneasy Case, supra note 17; Baird and Jackson, Adequate Protection, supra note 18;
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements,andthe Creditors'Bargain,
91 YALE LJ. 857 (1982).
21. Baird, Loss Distribution,supranote 20, at 827; Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 17,
at 128-33; Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection, supra note 18, at 100-01. Adler and
Picker question whether the collective action problems that justify bankruptcy's
interference with contract could not be solved through the market. Adler, Financialand
Political Theories, supra note 17, at 319-23; Randal C. Picker, Security Interests,
Misbehavior,and Common Pools,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 647 (1992).
22. Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 17, at 133; Jackson, supra note 20, at 862, 864.
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race and allows for coordinated, value-maximizing collection among
the investors in the enterprise.2'
The core of the creditors' bargain model is its reliance on the
rhetoric of hypothetical contract and transaction costs to explain the
need for a legal, as opposed to a market, regime to resolve the
questions posed by business failure. The bankruptcy regime is written
into all debt contracts as a consequence of federal bankruptcy law.
Baird and Jackson justify this imposition by pointing to the impossibility of contracting among the diverse parties interested in the
debtor.24 In this manner, the creditors' bargain model attempts to
vindicate bankruptcy's interference with non-bankruptcy debt
collection rights.
From this theoretical starting point, the model justifies only a
fairly minimalist bankruptcy regime. Under the model, bankruptcy
exists solely as a collection device benefiting those holding claims
Bankruptcy's
legally cognizable under non-bankruptcy law.'
encroachment on non-bankruptcy collection rights is closely circumscribed to include only those limitations necessary to avoid the
collective action problems inherent in the non-bankruptcy debt
collection process. Thus, relative priorities must be preserved so far
as practicable, and bankruptcy should not result in redistributions of
entitlements.'
Working from this emphasis on bankruptcy's debt collection
aspects, many commentators have questioned whether the creditors'
bargain model can justify the existence of the reorganization
provisions of Chapter 11. The model posits market failure as a
justification for bankruptcy. But while market failure may require
some form of collective proceeding-such as that provided by Chapter

23. The creditors' bargain model also provides a monitoring cost justification for
bankruptcy's automatic stay and pro rata distribution scheme. Under a non-bankruptcy
race collection scheme, each creditor would have an incentive to expend resources
monitoring the debtor and preparing for the race. Since the race would go to the swiftest,
each creditor would have an incentive to expend resources developing expertise in
collection. Such expenditures are lessened in a system that assures each creditor of a pro
rata distribution upon financial failure. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 20, at 863.
24. See, e.g., id. at 866-67. Rasmussen argues that nothing about bankruptcy requires
that it be conceived as a mandatory regime. Potential debt and equity holders could
bargain with a corporation over the range of bankruptcy remedies the corporation could
seek. The articles of incorporation provide a vehicle through which such agreements could
be effected. Thus, under Rasmussen's regime, bankruptcy would operate as a default rule.
Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 17, at 55-68.
25. See, eg., Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection, supra note 18, at 103.
26. Jackson, supra note 20, at 860.
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7 of the Code-it is possible that markets themselves could respond
to the concerns addressed by Chapter 11.
Chapter 11 provides a legal framework designed to address the
asset deployment and distributional questions raised by financial
failure.27 While liquidation and distribution of the cash generated by
liquidation are possible responses to the deployment and distribution
questions, the general thrust of Chapter 11 is that the business may
have a higher value in the hands of its pre-bankruptcy claimants.'
Thus, Chapter 11 is premised on the desirability of keeping the assets
of the business intact and distributing new debt and equity claims in
the business to the pre-bankruptcy claimants. This view of the
process leads many analysts to analogize Chapter 11 to a sale of the
business to its pre-bankruptcy creditors.29
The question raised by this description of the reorganization
process is whether Chapter 11's mandatory allocation of negotiating
leverage and its default rules requiring judicial valuation of the
business are necessitated by a market failure. Put differently, are
there any real impediments to market-based solutions to the
deployment and distributional aspects of financial failure? Several
market-based solutions have been proposed. The simplest is to
require a market auction of the assets of the bankrupt business, thus
completely bypassing the negotiation structure of Chapter 11.0 In
a somewhat more complicated proposal, Bebchuk has suggested an
option framework under which participants would be granted the right
to purchase a package of reorganization securities for a strike price

27. See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations,34 ARIZ. L. REv. 89, 91-94 (1992).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1977) ("The premise of a
business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which
they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap."), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179. This premise is also illustrated by the requirement that
a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization provide creditors at least as much as they would have
received in a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994).
29. E.g., JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 18, at 210-13; Baird, Uneasy Case,
supra note 17, at 127.
30. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 17, at 136. Markell proposes that the debtor's
exclusive right to file a plan be terminated upon the debtor's filing of a "new value" plan.
This termination would reduce entry fees for non-owner bids and enable the parties to
conduct an auction-like process. Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute
Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,44 STAN. L. REv. 69, 117-19 (1991).
More recently, Baird has expressed some reservations about the effectiveness of
auctions in all cases. Douglas G. Baird, RevisitingAuctions in Chapter11, 36 J.L. & ECON.
633, 647-52 (1993).
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equal to a pro rata share of the claims senior to the option holder.3 '
Other commentators, such as Adler, have taken the more radical
approach of advocating repeal of Chapter 11 in its entirety, arguing
that capital markets can provide an ex ante solution to the collective
action problems posited by the creditors' bargain model. 32
What links all of these reform proposals is that they share
creditor wealth maximization as a common criterion for a wellfunctioning bankruptcy regime.33 To justify the existing bankruptcy
regime under an economic analysis, one must show how the process
leads to better and cheaper asset deployment decisions than does the
market. Most commentators advocating repeal or radical change of
Chapter 11 rely on a generalized belief that the process is not wellsuited to maximizing the creditors' returns.34 Still others defend the
process as satisfying the creditor wealth-maximization criterion in
ways that markets cannot.35
While the debate rages over whether the existing bankruptcy
process satisfies the criterion of creditor wealth maximization, a small
but growing group of commentators are questioning the criterion
itself.3 6 This group points to the displacement that accompanies

31. Bebehuk, supra note 17, at 785-88; see also Aghion et al., supra note 17, at 532-36
(proposing a procedure similar to Bebchuk's involving solicitation of bids for the postbankruptcy firm).
32. Adler, Financialand PoliticalTheories,supra note 17, at 323-33 (advocating what
he calls "chameleon equity"); Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 17, at 489.
33. See Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 17, at 463-79 (noting that reallocation
imposes substantial efficiency costs); Aghion et al., supra note 17, at 525-26 (stating that
the role of bankruptcy is to centralize a firm's dismantling for the collective good of its
creditors); Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 17, at 127-28 (stating that bankruptcy avoids a
destructive race by individual creditors for their respective claims); Bebchuk, supra note
17, at 776 (noting that reorganization is desirable where going concern value is worth more
than assets sold piecemeal); Markell, supra note 30, at 70 (noting that reorganization is
premised on creditors' rights taking priority over equity interests).
34. See Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 17, at 484-89; Bebchuk, supra note 17, at
780; Roe, supra note 17, at 601.
35. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
411,414-17 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganizationof Large,Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669,
757-58 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance];Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, BargainingOver Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 127-31 (1990) [hereinafter
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share]; David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets,
Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. Rnv. 465, 503-09.
36. Warren, for example, offers a view of bankruptcy that calls attention to other
distributional issues of the regime. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 19, at 811-14;
see also Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 19, at 356 (offering a normative justification
for distributive policies). Korobkin argues that the varied dimensions of bankruptcy law

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

many bankruptcies and asks why a rational bankruptcy system cannot
take account of these interests. Financial failure may affect the
interests of employees, suppliers, communities, and others in ways
that cannot be captured by the creditor wealth-maximization model.
As a normative proposition, these commentators ask, why shouldn't
the bankruptcy
system consider all interests affected by financial
37
failure?
The attack is on two levels. First, critics of the economic
approach assert that the bankruptcy system as currently constituted
does not adhere to the strictures of the economic models. In support,
they point to the history of bankruptcy legislation38 and to several
examples of bankruptcy's redistributive effects 9 Second, critics
attack the economic approach's lack of concern with noneconomic
interests on a normative basis. Because corporate failure affects
broader interests than the ownership claims given primacy in the
economic models, the system that deals with this failure must take
into account all of the competing interests and values affected.
Otherwise, the critics assert, the model is without adequate normative
underpinnings.'
Among all of the critics, Korobkin has best captured the essence
of the debate over the appropriate role of corporate bankruptcy law.
Korobkin's true problem with the economic account is that it

show that its policies have evolved from more than just the economic account. Korobkin,
Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 732-39. Gross believes that the economic model is useful
but limited as it reveals only "one important piece of data"-money. Gross, supra note
19, at 1039. Carlson sees the creditors' bargain model as having "pure rhetorical appeal"
which "cannot coherently account for the bankruptcy gain." Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory,
supra note 19, at 460, 478 (1992). Ponoroff and Knippenberg argue that creditor wealth
maximization is not the sole purpose of bankruptcy, but rather that it is premised on an
"ever-shifting basis upon which bankruptcy courts must act to sort out and order a broad
spectrum of interests clamoring for protection in the bankruptcy proceeding." Lawrence
Ponoroff &F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good FaithFilingRequirement: Sentinel
of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 966 (1991).
37. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 19, at 475-78; Donald R. Korobkin, Value
and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 341 (1992)
[hereinafter Korobkin, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking); Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra
note 19, at 787-88.
38. David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1341, 1389
(1987); Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 746-51.
39. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 19, at 785-93; see also Thomas H.
Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Sharingand the Creditors' Bargain,75 VA. L. REV. 155, 178-90 (1989) (outlining possible
redistributive motivations in bankruptcy).
40. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 19, at 477-78; Korobkin, Bankruptcy
Decisionmaking,supra note 37, at 335.
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"misidentifies the problem to which bankruptcy law uniquely
responds."'" In contrast to the economic theorists' focus on the debt
collection aspects of the process, Korobkin sees bankruptcy as a
response to myriad problems associated with financial distress-a
"competition of diverse human values that are fundamentally
incommensurable" 4 2-- providing a forum in which economic as well
as non-economic aims may be pursued.43 An important aspect of
his theory is his broad conception of the corporation. He writes that
a view of bankruptcy that identifies a corporation as a pool of assets
"overlooks an essential aspect: a corporation is also an enterprise; it
He notes that a corporation, unlike property,
has personality."'
goes on to ascribe personal attributes to the
he
then
"has potential;"
corporation-seeing it as a moral, political and social actor.45
From this perspective, Korobkin views the bankruptcy process as
a response to the problems that financial distress poses to the
corporation in all of its aspects.46 Having liberated the corporation
from characterization as a pool of assets, Korobkin is free to bring
rehabilitative values into the equation. No longer is it relevant simply
to examine how the pool should be used and ownership interests
divided among the capital investors. Instead, a larger rehabilitative
discourse emerges from the bankruptcy process.4 7 Participants in this
discourse include not only those economically interested in the
outcome but also a broader group affected by the operations of the
corporation.48
In what may be the strongest normative stand against the
creditors' bargain model, David Gray Carlson attacks the model's lack
of inclusiveness with moralistic rhetoric. He sees the model as a
license for the debtor to "pillage the estate[s] of ... non-

41. Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 721.
42. Id. at 765.
43. Id. at 768-80. In a later piece, Korobkin provides some specifics regarding the
ways in which such interests may be considered. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note
19, at 572-75.
44. Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 745.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 768-72.
47. Id. at 772-74.
48. Korobkin's value-based account for bankruptcy includes labor and management
demands for compensation, creditors' demands for payment, shareholders' demands for
return on their investment, and government demands for taxes, along with other public
and community interests. Id. at 762-63.
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creditor[s],"49 and states that the model would justify robbing a
liquor store if it would maximize returns.' Carlson believes this vice
undermines both the utilitarian and libertarian underpinnings of the
model.51
Taking a much more limited stand against the narrow focus of
the economic account of bankruptcy law, Warren has criticized the
approach on both positive and normative grounds.5 2 She views
bankruptcy as incorporating loss distribution norms." In describing
the bankruptcy scheme, Warren sees a "dirty, complex, elastic,
interconnected"'5 4 process in which losses are distributed according
to criteria beyond those set out in credit contracts as they might be
enforced under non-bankruptcy law. 5 From a normative perspective, Warren simply illustrates that a significant problem with the
creditors' bargain model is that while attempting to eschew all
discussion of distributional consequences, the model itself offers a
distributional scheme-non-bankruptcy collection
law-without
56
inquiring into that scheme's appropriateness.
While the recommendations of the critics of the economic
approach to bankruptcy analysis are as diverse as those of the
economic analysts themselves, the idea of inclusion seems to provide
a unifying thread. According to the critics, by limiting the purpose of

49. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 19, at 476. Carlson elaborates:
Exile from the bargain allows the bargainers to prey on the excluded outsider.
In this model the exiled person is erased and dehumanized. For instance, the
simple creditors' bargain is quite consistent with the premise that bankruptcy law
should permit the debtor to pillage the estate of a noncreditor. Since creditors
in the bargain are not altruistic and are concerned only with maximizing their
collections, justifying such crimes is something the creditors' bargain could
encompass.
Id.(footnote omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id.at 477-78.
52. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 19, at 777; Warren, Imperfect World, supra
note 19, at 373-77.
53. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supranote 19, at 777 ("I see bankruptcy as an attempt
to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a
number of different actors. Bankruptcy encompasses a number of competing-and
sometimes conflicting-values in this distribution." (footnote omitted)).
54. Idtat 811.
55. Id.at 790-93.
56. See id. at 789-90. Warren does not go so far as to approve of a bankruptcy system
that results in the vindication of community interests. Warren, Imperfect World, supra
note 19, at 356 n.47. In a similar vein, Carlson objects that the creditors' bargain is unable
to justify accepting state collection law as the natural baseline against which creditors
bargain. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 19, at 461.
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bankruptcy to providing a collective means of collecting debt,
economic theorists have excluded from the debate the possibility that
bankruptcy may be an institution designed to resolve a wide range of
problems. They see the economic approach as limiting the participation of communities and employees even though the process
directly implicates their interests. From the descriptive perspective
presented by Warren, the economic theory fails to account for those
aspects of bankruptcy law that protect those interests. From the
normative perspective presented most clearly by Korobkin, the
approach fails to consider all of the interests worthy of protection.
Advocates of the creditor wealth-maximization criterion seek to
justify their exclusion of non-investor interests by pointing to the need
to avoid forum-shopping problems in the bankruptcy process.17 In
their view, displacement of employees and communities dependent on
a business is an unfortunate result of business failure that occurs
whether a company fails inside of bankruptcy or out."8
Redistributive rules will simply create incentives to use, or avoid, the
bankruptcy-process for reasons having nothing to do with whether the
company is facing a collective action problem. Since bankruptcy is a
costly device designed to avoid the specific problem of the common
pool, incentives that cause over- or under-utilization of the process
are to be condemned.59
While the forum-shopping analytic is attractive, it alone is an
inadequate response to the normative criticisms of the economic
approach to bankruptcy. Economic theorists begin by asserting that
the bankruptcy process is intended only to address collective action
problems at the lowest possible cost and then proceed to condemn all
incentives that stand in the way. As Korobkin has observed:
The economic account is like the stereotypical ugly
American abroad. "The Eiffel Tower," he complains, "is
57. See Baird, Loss Distribution,supra note 20, at 818; id. at 828 ("Allowing priorities
outside of bankruptcy but not inside is an open invitation to forum shopping...
58. According to Rasmussen:
It is one thing to express compassion for displaced workers, retirees who are left
with real bills but worthless promises, or communities struggling with a
disappearing industrial base.... Realizing that many companies that fail never
file a bankruptcy petition, the societal effect of system-wide business failures
seems not to be a bankruptcyconcern. Put simply, all of the problems associated
with corporate failure are not necessarily bankruptcy problems.
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter11, 8 BANKR. DEV.J. 319, 324 (1991).
In other words, it is not bankruptcy's mission to be the only regime in which a failing
business can honor claims of those who have little or no claim to its assets.
59. See Baird, Loss Distribution,supra note 20, at 824-28.
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not tall enough to be the Empire State Building and not
expensive enough to be the Trump Tower." His response to
anything foreign is to understand it in his own terms and to
evaluate it according to his own standards.'
The basic problem with the forum-shopping analytic is that it
begs the question of the appropriate role of the bankruptcy process.
The analytic begins from the perspective that bankruptcy exists as a
device to maximize economic returns to investors; it does not justify
such a view. Its reasoning is circular: Bankruptcy protection for noneconomic interests is undesirable because forum-shopping problems
will increase the cost of protecting economic interests; therefore,
bankruptcy should focus only on the protection of economic
interests.6 ' Thus, the forum-shopping analytic is normatively
satisfying only when one sees bankruptcy in its limited terms.62
In essence, participants in the bankruptcy debate are speaking
past one another. 3 Advocates of the economic approach seem to be64
primarily concerned about preserving allocative efficiency.
Maximizing creditor wealth translates directly into maximizing asset
values. Maximizing asset values, in turn, satisfies the general
allocative efficiency mandate that assets be put to their highest and
best use.
Most of the critics of the economic approach would agree that
market norms and allocative efficiency are important,' but would

60. Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 740.
61. According to Korobkin, "[T]he creditors' bargain model suffers from the same
disability as the economic model itself: its explanation is limited by the economic

account's vision of bankruptcy law as a mechanism for achieving superior economic
returns." ld. at 737.
62. One may more charitably view the argument by focusing on the fact that
bankruptcy simply provides an optional avenue of enforcement. If non-bankruptcy
collection law does not provide substantive protection for the interests of non-investors,
crafting that protection under bankruptcy law may simply result in its non-use. See Baird,
Loss Distribution,supra note 20, at 829-30. Thus, limiting protection of such interests to
the bankruptcy arena will reduce the effectiveness of that protection. One obvious
response to this argument is that it asserts that less-than-complete protection is worse than

no protection. A broader objection is that the argument assumes that bankruptcy must
remain optional-the true reason for bankruptcy's optional character lies principally with
the cost argument taken up here.
63. One recent exception appears in Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal
Bankruptcy Rules andSocialJustice,1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen,
Social Justice], in which Rasmussen attempts to meet, head on, arguments based on
redistributive norms.

64. Adler provides an expansive analysis of all of the potential costs of the
reorganization process. See Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 17, at 456-76.
65. See, e.g., Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 19, at 595.
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disagree that allocative efficiency is the only goal of a bankruptcy
regime.66 These commentators speak in redistributive terms.
Concern for the individual or community harmed by the strict
enforcement of contract is their touchstone, yet they often fail to meet
the concerns of the economic theorists by addressing the specific ways
in which they believe that the bankruptcy system might be well suited
to protecting the interests of those groups. Economic analysts, of
course, speak in economic terms. Their primary concern lies in the
preservation of market norms as a means of increasing aggregate
wealth (taken by the economic theorists as the best measure of wellbeing). Yet, at least in the area of bankruptcy scholarship, they often
fail to respond directly to the claim that bankruptcy may provide an
avenue for achieving distributional goals-even at a cost of some
allocative inefficiency.
A justification for limiting bankruptcy law to the enforcement of
investor claims is possible. Treating bankruptcy as a broadly inclusive
device intended to protect the interests of investors and non-investors
alike requires close scrutiny of the capabilities of the process to
achieve those goals. It is not enough simply to point to problems in
need of resolution. We must further assess the fit between our
normative goals and the institutions designed to achieve them. As
this Article will demonstrate, bankruptcy in particular and the judicial
process generally are poorly designed to achieve redistributive goals.
While this institutional capability argument has been made by several
economic theorists, including Baird and Jackson themselves,67 the
concern has been inadequately developed in favor of the forumshopping argument. But there is more to the institutional capability
argument than has been heretofore made. Rather than being an
adjunct to the forum-shopping concerns that dominate the economic
analysis, the argument deserves elevation to an independent justification for an investor-focused bankruptcy regime.
II. NON-INVESTOR PROTECTION UNDER CHAPTER 11
One of the primary grounds for criticism of the creditor wealthmaximization criterion is that it is not an accurate description of the
current bankruptcy system.6" The bankruptcy process departs from
66. See Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 19, at 340.
67. Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection, supra note 18, at 101-02.
68. See, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 39, at 163 ("[T]he simple maximization
perspective treats as indistinguishable-and equally undesirable-the various distributional
effects that are unambiguously present in bankruptcy."); Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra
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non-bankruptcy priorities in ways that cannot be justified under the
economic criterion. 61 Thus, critics argue, bankruptcy can only be
explained fully in terms that include loss allocation and the protection
of non-investor interests as a fundamental policy.7'
While the jury is still out on the empirical question of whether
the reorganization provisions of the Code are an efficient means of
maximizing creditor wealth,7 it is becoming increasingly difficult to
understand Chapter 11 in such narrow terms. Creditor wealth
maximization does not necessarily require a reorganization process
that incorporates delay and thorny valuation problems. There is little
reason to believe that a market-based solution to the asset
deployment questions raised by failure would not serve the ends of
creditor72wealth maximization more effectively than does the current
process.
If Chapter 11 cannot be understood on the basis of creditor
wealth maximization, perhaps it can be explained on the basis that it
provides some protection for various non-investor interests by
distributing the losses occasioned by business failure among all
affected groups.7 The bankruptcy process distributes the losses from

note 19, at 739 ("[I]f the essence of bankruptcy is simply to maximize economic outcomes,
why did bankruptcy law emerge as a system with the varied contours and dimensions that
it has?").
69. See, e.g., Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 739.
70. See id.at 788-89; Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 19, at 813.
71. In their highly publicized empirical study of the effects of Chapter 11 on returns
to bondholders, Bradley and Rosenzweig concluded that the process has failed to provide
an efficient means of maximizing creditor returns. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 17,
at 1049. Their study has been roundly criticized, principally on methodological grounds.
See Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A
Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IowA L. REV.669 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin,
Unwarranted Case]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 79 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The
Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE LJ.437 (1992) [hereinafter Warren,
Untenable Case for Repeal].
72. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
73. In addition to their substantial methodological objections to the Bradley and
Rosenzveig study, both Warren and Korobkin criticize the study for failing to take into
account other goals of the reorganization process. Warren notes that redistributional goals
may provide a justification for slight inefficiencies in the process. Warren, Untenable Case
for Repeal, supra note 71, at 467-77. Korobkin criticizes Bradley and Rosenzweig for
failing to develop their claim that maximizing firm value is consistent with protecting the
interests of non-investor constituencies. Korobkin, Unwarranted Case, supra note 71, at
728-34.
Gross criticizes Bradley and Rosenzweig solely on the basis of their failure to consider
the goal of protecting community interests in the Chapter 11 process. Gross, supra note
19, at 1035-36.
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failure in two ways. First, the Code includes a small number of
explicit departures from the general principle of equality of
distribution. As one example, section 507(a) provides a limited
priority for particular claims74 in order to protect certain classes of
vulnerable claimants. 5 A second and more substantial shift in nonbankruptcy entitlements is the redistributive effect of the reorganization provisions of Chapter 11 of the Code. The delays inherent
in the process may result in substantial redistributions from the
creditors of the business to equity holders, managers and the
employees and communities dependent on the business. One way of
justifying such delays may be that by allowing delays the process will
serve to protect the interests of non-investors by providing the
business with every opportunity to weather the storm. 76 This policy
of indirect loss allocation is well represented in the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.77
In some cases, however, reorganization policy need not raise
redistributive concerns. Part of the justification for Chapter 11 is that,
in a successful reorganization, everyone can win.78 The investors in
the business enjoy the going-concern value preserved by the
avoidance of a piecemeal liquidation, and the non-investor
constituencies benefit from the continuation of a business that
provides employment, pays taxes and contributes to the general wellbeing of the community in many other ways. 79
Of course, if every reorganization resulted in the realization of
positive going-concern value, the justification would prove dispositive.
No one could possibly object to a process that provided creditors with
an enhanced recovery and saved jobs to boot. The problem with this
justification is that it says nothing about the cases in which there win
be winners and losers. In cases involving businesses that ultimately
prove impossible to reorganize, an attempt at reorganization may
74. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994) (providing wage priority to the extent of $4,000); id.

§ 507(a)(4) (providing priority for pension plan contributions); id. § 507(a)(5) (according
grain producers and fishermen priorities); id. § 507(a)(6) (providing priority for consumer

deposits).
75. Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 19, at 352-53.
76. Id. at 354-56.
77. For an analysis of the legislative history, see id. at 355 n.45.
78. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code states, "The purpose of a business
reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business's finances so that
it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce
a return for its stockholders." See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 28, at 220, reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179.
79. Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 19, at 354-56.
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prove costly to the creditors of the business who have watched good
money chase bad. In these cases, those operating within the process
must address redistributive issues.
The uncertainty surrounding the business prospects of the debtor
complicates such issues. Investors of varying priorities will likely
diverge in their assessment of the proper course of action. Relatively
senior creditors may seek the immediate liquidation of the business,
while junior claimants and equity holders are more likely to attempt
to prolong the reorganization effort. Investors and managers may act
strategically to influence asset deployment decisions in an effort to
achieve some distributional advantage. Somewhere within the
complex web of negotiations designed to resolve these conflicts lie the
understated redistributive policies of Chapter 11. This section
examines the redistributive function of Chapter 11 in an effort to
illustrate the indirect way in which it operates and the haphazard way
in which non-investor protection is provided.
A. Chapter 11 as a Protective Device for Non-Investor Interests
Chapter 11 provides a forum and impetus for negotiations
intended to address the asset deployment and financial restructuring
First, some
issues facing participants in a failed corporation."
decision must be made regarding the appropriate deployment of the
business assets. Is the business fundamentally sound or is it no longer
economically viable? Put differently, can the assets best be used in
their present configuration or are they best liquidated piecemeal?81
Second, the ownership interests in the assets must be reconfigured.
If the business is of insufficient value to satisfy all of the claims

80. See Frost, supra note 27, at 91-101; LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance,
supra note 35, at 678-80. The negotiations center on the development of a plan of
reorganization that sets forth the resolution of both the asset deployment and financial
restructuring questions. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1994) (setting out the required and
optional contents of a plan of reorganization).
81. Chapter 11 is premised on the idea that the value of a business is maximized by
keeping the assets together rather than liquidating the assets on a piecemeal basis. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text. The process provides several opportunities to test
the'presumption. For example, § 1129(a)(7) requires that a plan of reorganization provide
each claimant with at least as much as that claimant would receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation before the plan may be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994). Not only
does such a requirement provide a minimum level of protection for the priority of each
claimant, but it also attempts to ensure that the corporation has positive going-concern
value.
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against it, the claims must be revised to reflect the value of the
business. 2
Maximizing the economic value of the estate for the benefit of
the creditors as a group requires that each decision be viewed
separately. The value-maximizing deployment of assets exists
A business that
independently of the distributional question.'
makes an obsolete product will continue to do so no matter how the
claims against its assets are distributed. Thus the process should limit
the ability of parties to manipulate the deployment decision in an
effort to obtain some distributional advantage. ' In addition, a
value-maximizing bankruptcy regime would ensure that the individual
or group in control of the deployment decision hold the residual claim
to the assets of the business.8 5 That is, decisionmakers should stand
either to gain or lose depending on the success or failure of the
approach chosen. Since deployment decisions involve uncertainty,
such decisions cannot be characterized as "correct" ex ante. Instead
of a quest to find the correct decision, the best the process can hope
for is to locate decisionmaking authority in the group interested in the
outcome of the decision. Only this group holds the correct set of
incentives to make value-maximizing decisions.
In concept, Chapter 11 fulfills these two requirements of value
maximization. Through its voting structure, the process allows those
economically interested in the business to make determinations

82. Through its classification and impairment provisions, Chapter 11 allows the
renegotiation of the capital structure of the business to reflect the value of the reorganized
entity. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1994) (requiring that the plan of reorganization specify
the treatment of any class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan). As to
the general structure of the Chapter 11 reorganization process, see Kenneth Klee, All You
Ever Wanted to Know about Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979) [hereinafter Klee, Cram Down I]; Kenneth Klee, Cram Down H1,
64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990).
83. This assertion is a relatively straightforward application of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem that a firm's capital structure does not affect overall firm value. Franco
Modigliani & Merton G. Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporateFinance and the Theory
of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958).
84. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, BargainingAfter the Falland
the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 787 (1988)
("Bankruptcy law should ensure that fights about who owns a firm's assets should not
undercut efforts to use them in the most beneficial way possible.").
85. See Frost, supra note 27, at 135-38. This tenet of value maximization has long
been a staple of financial economic literature. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (1991) ("As
the residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incentives ... to make
discretionary decisions.").
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regarding the appropriate deployment of assets. 86 By setting out
default distributional rules, Chapter 11 also provides limits on the
ability of parties to manipulate the deployment decision to their
distributional advantage."
In practice, however, Chapter 11 may depart substantially from
the requirements of value maximization. One widely noted example
is the failure of the process to compensate under-secured creditors for
the delay in enforcing their non-bankruptcy right to foreclose on the
property securing their claims.8
As Baird and Jackson have
illustrated, this failure provides junior claimants an opportunity to
avoid the cost of delay as they attempt to prolong the inevitable death
of the business.89 In terms of the asset deployment decisionmaking
process outlined above, the failure to pay interest separates those in
control of the decision (managers and junior claimants) from the
group bearing the cost of an incorrect decision (the under-secured
creditor). The result of such a separation is likely to be a protracted
reorganization.
The manipulation of asset deployment decisions not only results
in a reshuffling of entitlements among investors of different classes,
but it also may provide incidental protection of various non-investor
constituencies. To illustrate, imagine a Chapter 11 debtor corporation
that operates a manufacturing facility in a community that is
completely dependent on the plant. The community's dependence is
manifested in several ways. Most directly, many of its residents work
at the plant. In addition, a number of businesses in the community
supply the plant with raw materials and ancillary services such as
office cleaning and refuse collection. Other businesses such as banks,
restaurants and auto repair shops serve the employees of the plant.
Finally, the community relies on the taxes paid directly by the plant
and by the direct and indirect dependents of the plant.
86. The Code allows only a claimant or equity interest holder to accept or reject a
plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (1994).

87. In the absence of a negotiated solution to the financial restructuring question, the
Code applies a rule of absolute priority to the distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
The absolute priority rule requires each class of claimants to be paid in full in cash or in
reorganization securities prior to the retention or receipt of any property by junior
claimants. For a general discussion of the absolute priority rule, see Klee, Cram Down I,
supra note 82, at 140-46.
88. In United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S.

365,382 (1988), the Supreme Court held that under-secured creditors (those creditors with
claims in excess of the value of the property securing them) were not entitled to receive
monthly payments for the use value of their collateral.
89. Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection,supra note 18, at 129.
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The manufacturing plant produces vacuum switches for the
automotive industry. As automotive technology has progressed,
vacuum switches have been increasingly replaced by electronic
switches produced by other manufacturers. Revenues therefore have
declined substantially and, immediately prior to fling the petition, the
company's managers foresaw that the company soon would be out of
cash. In the month preceding the bankruptcy, management wisely
refused to make a quarterly interest and sinking fund payment on the
company's substantial public debt. Protected by the automatic stay,90
the business will be able to operate for at least a year, using operating
revenues supplemented by this hoard of cash.
During the exclusivity period,91 management desperately worked
to develop a business plan that would allow the business to survive.
Management's plan required a modest retooling of the plant that
would allow it to produce vacuum testing devices that could be sold
to the auto repair industry. In a motion to extend the exclusivity
period, 92 management presented the outlines of the business plan to
the bankruptcy court. Several large holders of public debt argued
against the extension of exclusivity and sought to convert the case to
Chapter 7.93
These creditors' argument revolved around their assertion that
the market for automotive testing equipment is dominated by a few
large, well-known, companies, and that entry into the market would
use up the remaining cash. They further argued that even if the
business could enter the market successfully, the same technological
innovations that destroyed the market for switches would ultimately
eliminate the need for testing equipment. While the immediate
liquidation of the business would result in substantial losses to all

90. Section 362 of the Code imposes a stay against collection activities upon commencement of the bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
91. The debtor retains the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization for 180
days after the order for relief. Id. § 1121(b).

92. One of the most important factors regarding the length of the bankruptcy process
is the debtor's ability to retain control of the plan process. The Code provides that the

court may extend, or reduce, the period of exclusivity. Id. § 1121(e). Motions for
extensions of exclusivity are common, particularly in large, complex reorganizations. See

LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance, supra note 35, at 716-19 (providing statistics
on extensions of exclusivity for 43 large bankruptcy cases).
93. The Code allows parties in interest to move for the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case
or its conversion to Chapter 7 for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). Cause includes such
factors as continuing losses, id. § 1112(b)(1), inability to effectuate a plan, id. § 1112(b)(2),
and unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to creditors, id § 1112(b)(3).
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concerned, the losses resulting from such a liquidation would be less
than the losses likely under management's plan.
This situation clearly presents the conflict between the desires of
the community and those of the creditors of the failing business. To
the extent that the judge is concerned only with maximizing the value
of the estate from the perspective of the creditors, she need only
determine which group of investors holds the residual claim to the
assets of the business. By isolating this group, the judge can
determine who will be called upon to put assets at risk in the decision
to retool the plant.94 These claimants hold the correct set of
economic incentives to make the decision that will maximize the value
of the estate. Assuming that under no circumstances is it likely that
the business will have a value adequate to pay the public bondholders
in full, the judge should consider the wishes of these creditors and
liquidate the business. They among all investors stand to gain or lose
from the success or failure of the retooling investmentY
If, on the other hand, the bankruptcy judge considers the
interests of the community and other dependents on the plant, the

94. In the words of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
[S]elf interest concentrates the mind, and people who must back their beliefs with
their purses are more likely to assess ... value ... accurately than are people
who simply seek to make an argument. Astute investors survive in competition;
those who do not understand the value of assets are pushed aside. There is no
similar process of natural selection among expert witnesses and bankruptcy
judges.
In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987).
95. See Frost, supra note 27, at 135-38.
In practice, it will be difficult to isolate the group that holds the residual claim.
Finding that group requires that we know the value of the business, yet finding the value
of the business involves the same problems presented in determining the correct asset
deployment. Value is contingent on expected return and risk-the same variables at issue
in the question of asset deployment. This difficulty does not mean that the judge must
abandon the use of financial economic principles in guiding her decision, however. In
many cases it will be possible to determine who does not hold the residual claim, even if
is not possible to determine precisely who does. In the example presented here, it may
be possible to establish that, even in a best-case scenario, the company will remain
insolvent. If that is the case, the court should discount any argument put forth by equity
holders because they are not backing their investment with assets. See Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991)
(proposing a procedure to exclude equity holders from participation in the case if it is clear
that the debtor is insolvent and will remain so for the duration of the case); David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of CorporateVoting in Chapter11 Reorganization Cases,
78 VA. L. REV. 461, 500 (1992) (suggesting that, while it is difficult to determine who all
of the residual owners are, it is unlikely that shareholders occupy this position). Similarly,
in many cases, the court may discount the decision of senior lenders who are likely to be
paid in full even in the worst case scenario. Frost, supra note 27, at 135-38.
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outcome of the issue is far from clear. The judge may determine that
the interests of the community in keeping the business operating
outweigh the interests of the creditors in liquidating the business.
Alternatively, the judge may believe that the business is too far gone
to save and see little reason to prolong the agony.
While the Code does not explicitly grant the judge the authority
to consider the interests of the community in making her decision,96
there may be an implicit presumption operating in -favorof giving the
company a chance to reorganize. The Code places few limits on the
judge's discretion to extend exclusivity.97 Providing the corporation
a chance to reorganize against the wishes of the residual claimants is
perhaps the only method through which the bankruptcy process can
effect a sharing of losses between those residual claimants and
others.98
It is no answer to say that the retooling stands a chance of
succeeding and that in such a case the creditors will benefit from a
higher recovery than an immediate liquidation would provide. From
the perspective of the creditors, while it is true that the project does
have some chance of succeeding, it also has a chance of failure-that
is, it has risk. Presumably, the creditors have made an evaluation of
the project's risk and return and have determined that the net present
value of the project is negative. Unless creditors systematically
undervalue investments, forcing such investments will result in an
increase in creditor losses from financial failure.
B. Non-InvestorProtectionand the Bankruptcy GovernanceStructure
The decisions that most concern everyone in a Chapter 11 case
usually revolve around a single conflict: the interests of relatively
senior claimants on the estate versus the interests of those junior to

96. In contrast, § 1165 requires that the court consider the public interest in applying

particular sections of Chapter 11 that relate solely to railroad reorganizations. See 11
U.S.C. § 1165 (1994).
97. For example, the Code places no outside restriction on the length of time a debtor
may remain in Chapter 11. Also, until recently, decisions to extend exclusivity were
considered interlocutory and, therefore, nonappealable. See, e.g., First Am. Bank of N.Y.
v. Century Glove, Inc., 64 B.R. 958, 961-62 (Bankr. D. Del. 1986). The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994 amended 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) to make orders extending or shortening
the exclusivity period immediately appealable. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 102, 108 Stat. 4106, 4108 (1994).
98. The point here is not that bankruptcy judges routinely make such implicit loss
allocations. Instead, the foregoing analysis supports only the observation that the
bankruptcy process is capable of performing its loss allocation function only indirectly-through asset deployment decisions.
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them. In most Chapter 11 cases, creditor and equity interests are
likely to diverge significantly.9 Equity owners, understanding that
the liquidation of an insolvent firm will reveal their lack of economic
interest in the business, are likely to opt for reorganization at all
costs.1"° On the other hand, creditors who will likely be paid in
full-even on the liquidation of the business-have little incentive to
continue their relationship with the firm in bankruptcy."' These
creditors likely would opt for liquidation regardless of the soundness
of the business. Not only will senior and junior claimants clash
regarding such fundamental issues as the contents of the plan of
reorganization, but they may also find that many subsidiary issues
implicate the broader reorganization/liquidation conflict." z The
Code places the management of the business at the center of this
conflict through the concept of the debtor in possession 3 and
through its provisions granting the debtor the exclusive right to
propose a plan of reorganization. 1"
Chapter 11 provides a structure for negotiation of the issues
raised by the liquidation/reorganization conflict. The negotiations
take place against a backdrop of three different types of rules. The
first type includes rules that provide a representational structure."
99. See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 35, at 683-87.
100. See id. at 685 ("The holders of underwater claims and interests often have reason
to oppose liquidation until the distributions to them under a reorganization plan have been
fixed."); see also Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection,supra note 18, at 107 ("Members
of any group of investors that would be eliminated by a present liquidation or sale of
assets have nothing to lose by seeking a solution that avoids a final distribution today.");
Laura Lin, Shift of FiduciaryDuty upon CorporateInsolvency: ProperScope of Directors'
Duty to Creditors,46 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1496 (1993) ("Shareholders [of an insolvent
firm] are highly motivated to overinvest in risky propositions and to underinvest in stable
ones. Shareholders also are likely to delay liquidation, even if this strategy causes further
loss to the firm.").
101. Because such claimants have fixed claims, they will not benefit from any potential
increase in value resulting from the reorganization. In the event of catastrophe, however,
such creditors may bear some of the losses. See Frost, supra note 27, at 130; see also Lin,
supra note 100, at 1491 ("Unlike shareholders, creditors prefer management to risk as little
as possible because they have little to gain if the risky ventures succeed and will suffer
further loss if these projects fail.").
102. Frost, supra note 27, at 97-101.
103. Formally, the debtor in possession is the pre-bankruptcy entity. 11 U.S.C. §§
101(13), 1101(1) (1994). Of course, in the case of a corporation, a grant of power to the
debtor in possession is effectively a grant of power to the management of the bankrupt
corporation. See LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance,supra note 35, at 679-80.
104. See supra notes 91-92.
105. Section 1102 requires the appointment of a creditors' committee representing the
interests of general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1994). Such a committee is
necessary to overcome the collective action problems that would otherwise be faced by a
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Another type provides standards for operating the business.""6
Finally, the Code provides default rules for the distribution of assets
This backdrop of rules operates to
or claims against assets."
provide each group of pre-bankruptcy investors negotiating leverage
that roughly corresponds with its non-bankruptcy entitlements.'
Conventional bankruptcy analysis focuses on the clash of
priorities of those holding debt and equity claims against the
corporation to resolve the reorganization/liquidation dilemma. Where
do non-investor interests fit within this carefully crafted negotiation
One answer is, everywhere generally but nowhere
structure?
specifically. The Code provides a right to "part[ies] in interest" to
raise and be heard on any issue in Chapter 11."° While "parties in
interest" may be read broadly enough to include the interests of labor
unions, the city in which the business is located and even individual

large number of claimants, each holding a small claim. Without some representational
structure, many individual creditors would lack the incentive to monitor managers or even
engage in the negotiations over the plan. The size of their claims simply would not justify
the time and expense involved.
106. The requirement of judicial approval of such transactions as debtor-in-possession
financing and asset sales can be seen as an attempt to replace market and contractual
controls on managerial behavior that exist outside of bankruptcy. See Frost, supra note
27, at 125-29.
107. The absolute priority rule and the best interest of the creditors test seek to ensure
that managers and equity holders are unable to combine with senior creditors in an
attempt to freeze out the interests of unsecured creditors. See generally Markell, supra
note 30, at 74-90 (outlining the origins and status of the absolute priority rule).
108. Many of these Code provisions may be appropriately characterized as attempts to
resolve the agency problems created by a separation of ownership from control in a
situation in which ownership is uncertain. The multiple contractual defaults that
characterize and provide impetus for the bankruptcy process create the uncertainty in
ownership. Ownership is contingent on the value of the assets. If the corporation is
solvent, shareholders may be characterized as owners. In the more likely event that the
corporation has an insufficient value to pay its debts in full, some class of creditors should
be the owners. The question of firm value, and therefore ownership, is the essence of the
negotiations over the question of how interests in the corporation should be divided.
While those negotiations proceed, the managers of the business may be called upon to
serve multiple masters. See; eg., Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11
Reorganizations: Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 603-05 (1993);
Harvey R. Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship
Between DirectorsandStockholders of Solvent andInsolvent Corporations,23 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1467, 1488 (1993); Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11
Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6
BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 36 (1989).
109. 11 U.S.C § 1109(b) (1994); see also FED. R. BANKR. PROc. 2018(a) (allowing the
court to "permit any interested entity to intervene generally or with respect to any
specified matter").
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employees," the Code nowhere grants these parties any substantive
rights. Instead, the most important rights in a Chapter 11
proceeding-the right to vote on a plan of reorganization.. and
rights under the absolute priority rule" 2 -are the exclusive province
of debt and equity investors.
This is not to say that non-investor constituencies are without
champions in the bankruptcy arena. But the representation of the
community and the employees in the process turns on whether some
group with substantive entitlements share their goals. Non-investor
groups are likely to hold incentives that correspond with those of the
investors who are unlikely to receive any distribution from the
reorganization or liquidation of the business."' For both groups the
liquidation of the business is the worst possible outcome."' This
harsh reality, coupled with the fact that these groups do not put any
capital at risk in the continuation of the business, creates an incentive
to extend the reorganization in the hope that the business's prospects
will improve dramatically." 5
This method of indirect protection is incoherent at best. While
non-investor interests may be represented by equity holders or
managers, nothing requires such representation. Nearly two-thirds of
the businesses filing a bankruptcy petition over the past three years
have chosen to liquidate under Chapter 76
Even in Chapter 11
nothing protects the interests of communities and employees once the
managers and junior interests have abandoned the effort.
110. See In re Public Serv. Co., 88 B.R. 546 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (refusing to limit

intervention under Rule 2018(a) and party in interest status under § 1109(b) to creditors
or interest holders); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743,754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("[T]he concept of 'party in interest' is an elastic and broad one designed to give a
Court great latitude to insure fair representation of all constituencies impacted in any
significant way by a Chapter 11 case.").
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
112. See supra note 87.
113. In most bankruptcy cases, shareholders of the business will occupy this position.
Assuming that the business is hopelessly insolvent, shareholders have little to lose in
extending the reorganization as long as possible. See Frost, supra note 27, at 130.
114. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
115. Several commentators have also demonstrated that insolvency also creates an
incentive to pursue high risk projects because those in control of the decisionmaking
apparatus reap substantial gains from high risk projects but do not bear any significant risk
of loss. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 17, at 131-32; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble
with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729, 732-39 (1993). Prolonging the reorganization
process can be viewed as a high risk strategy when there is little likelihood of a successful

reorganization.
116. United States Bankruptcy Court Data, THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND
ALMANAC (1992, 1993).
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In addition, protection for non-investor interests is nonexistent in
corporations that do not have significant credit capital. As Baird has
illustrated, one possible means of opting out of the current
bankruptcy regime is to eliminate significant debt from the capital
structure of the business. 7 Placing all of the capital providers in
the firm on the same priority level eliminates their ability to achieve
gains through strategic behavior. Investors in a corporation funded
purely through equity capital have the same incentives and, therefore,
can be expected to choose the value-maximizing decision without
regard for the interests of non-investor constituencies.
The fact that the bankruptcy system provides only incomplete
protection to non-investor interests does not, standing alone, warrant
an elimination of the protection that does exist. A little protection
may be better than none at all. The problem instead lies in balancing
the limited benefits of this method of protection against the cost of its
benefits. Under the current regime, non-investors gain or lose
protection without regard to the worth of their claims. Thus, the
process is not designed to ensure that its benefits flow to those in
need.
The bankruptcy system also fails to consider explicitly the cost of
the indirect protection, not only on the creditors of the business, but
also on constituencies far removed from a particular case. As will be
illustrated in the remainder of this paper, non-investor protection in
the bankruptcy process may have economy-wide effects that are
poorly considered due to the indirect nature of the protection.
Bankruptcy judges and lawyers speak in economic and legal terms
rather than social terms. Under its current design, the reorganization
process pushes social policy concerns into the background where they
lurk unspoken. Facts essential to determining the social costs of
failure find no means of expression. As a consequence, while it is
possible that the process serves some broad social function, we cannot
be sure of the level of such concern, its cost, or who bears that cost.
As a matter of institutional design, the current bankruptcy regime
seems ill-suited to undertake an analysis of the difficult policy choices
implicated by distributive goals.

117. Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out"
Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913, 913-14 (1994).
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III. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A PROTECTIVE
BANKRUPTCY REGIME

Of course, the fact that the existing bankruptcy process does not
provide a coherent means of distributing the social costs of business
failure does not provide a normative justification for excluding noninvestor interests from its reach. It may simply point out the need for
reform. It might be possible to craft a bankruptcy scheme that
explicitly considers the costs and benefits of non-investor protection
in particular cases. The railroad reorganization provisions of the
Code"' might provide some guidance. Section 1165 provides the
statutory authorization lacking in non-rail cases by requiring the court
to consider the interests of the public in applying several substantive
provisions of the railroad reorganization sections." 9 The representational concerns discussed above are also alleviated in a rail case.
Section 1164 provides regulatory authorities the right to appear and
be heard in cases involving railroads."
Finally, section 1163
reduces the governance problems that might be encountered in a
protective bankruptcy regime by requiring 2the appointment of a
trustee in every railroad reorganization case.' '
The observation that the specific managerial and representational
difficulties involved in the protection of non-investor interests might
be resolved places us at a crossroads. Should corporate bankruptcy
reform take us in the direction of creating a broad, inclusive regime
designed to balance all of the competing interests affected by business
failure? Or should we instead limit the reorganization process so that
it focuses solely on investor claims, and leave the alleviation of the
hardship associated with business failure to other institutions?
The practical and normative dimensions of such questions are
interwoven. What we should be looking for in choosing a direction
is the fit between the practical capabilities of the process and the
normative policies chosen. This section begins that exploration by
analyzing the justifications underlying protective bankruptcy policies
118. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161-74 (1994).
119. L. § 1165. The judge must consider the public interest in applying sections
relating to collective bargaining agreements, rejection of a lease of a rail line, abandonment of a line, determination of administrative expense priority, the contents and
confirmation of a plan of reorganization, and the liquidation of the rail debtor.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1164 (1994).
121. Id. § 1163. The appointment of a trustee at least provides a check against

managers who might raise tenuous public interest concerns in order to perpetuate
themselves in office.
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in an attempt to distill the practical questions raised by those
justifications.
A. The Normative Dimension: Departuresfrom Explicit Contracting
Based on DistributiveAims
The way in which we view Chapter l1's function depends in large
part on our view of the baseline allocation of rights in the corporate
enterprise. Discussions centering on such notions as wealth transfers
or externalities are particularly unhelpful unless we have developed
a firm sense of entitlements. If one starts from the perspective that
contractual default gives creditors at least a contingent claim to the
assets of the business, prolonging the reorganization in order to
protect the interests of non-investors can be viewed as causing a
wealth transfer from the creditors to the non-investors.' 22 But if we
view employees, communities, suppliers and other non-investors as
having interests entitled to protection, the lack of such protection in
bankruptcy could be characterized as creating a wealth transfer from
these stakeholders to the creditors.
One method of addressing the problem of determining a baseline
is by resort to the notions of efficiency that characterize market and
contractual analysis. Standard economic analysis suggests that the
baseline itself becomes less important when express contract is
available to allocate gains and losses ex ante." On one hand, if the
bankruptcy process were designed to focus solely on investor interests,
non-investor constituencies could bargain for protection against the
losses caused by firm failure. Employees could bargain for severance
pay devices. Communities could bargain for protection by conditioning tax abatements or the provision of services on the continued
operation of the plant for a period of time sufficient to allow the
community to recoup its investment. 24 The breach of such contrac122. The creditors of the business are delayed in the enforcement of their rights, and
the capital they would have realized from the exercise of those rights is placed at risk in
a venture in which they would not otherwise be interested in investing.
123. The Coase Theorem suggests that in the absence of transaction costs parties will
bargain to the most efficient allocation of rights regardless of the baseline rule. Ronald
H. Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). According to this view,
the desirability of a particular baseline turns on whether it minimizes transaction costs.
See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
124. States are beginning to require that companies agree to repay tax abatements and
other economic incentives in the event of plant closure or other failure of the project to
provide anticipated benefits. Susan Headden, Dealing with CorporateFlight,U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., June 13, 1994, at 62; James B. Treece et al., States Now Want a MoneyBack Guarantee,BUS. WK., Sept. 21, 1992, at 35-36.
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tual protections would give rise to claims, in turn providing these
stakeholders a direct voice in the bankruptcy process.
On the other hand, to the extent that the bankruptcy regime
protects non-investors, providers of capital might have an incentive to
counteract such protections through contractual devices. In theory at
least, a broad, inclusive bankruptcy process could incorporate
procedures through which non-investors might agree to forego the
protections the process provides. Creditors could insist upon receiving
waivers of protection as a condition of lending."z In a world
without transaction costs, investors and non-investors alike would be
indifferent to the baseline allocation of rights in the bankruptcy
process.!'
On this view, the choice of policy direction becomes a matter of
determining which baseline minimizes transaction costs. Since
bargaining to change baseline entitlements is costly, minimizing
transaction costs generally requires that the baseline chosen comport
This
with parties' ex ante desires in as many cases as possible."
criterion seems to support an investor-focused bankruptcy regime.
Employees and communities rarely bargain for a voice in the
bankruptcy process even though the current regime protects their
interests imperfectly, if at all. Therefore, if we assume that these
constituencies' relationships with corporations are the product of
freely exercised and informed choice,"2 we would likely conclude
that an investor-focused view of bankruptcy most closely conforms to
the desired risk allocation of all the parties. 29 The relative cost of
125. See Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice, supra note 17, at 66-67 (advocating the use of a
corporation's articles of incorporation as a contractual device through which a waiver of
bankruptcy protections might be effected).
126. Of course, in a world truly without transaction costs, bankruptcy itself would not
be necessary. Parties would negotiate complete contingent contracts providing for
outcomes for each possible state of the world.

127. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 85, at 15 ("[Corporate law should
contain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm's
length... sufficiently low.").
128. This assumption, of course, cannot hold. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying
text.
129. In analyzing corporate constituency statutes that provide protection to nonshareholder constituencies, Macey noted:
Merely because non-shareholder constituencies decline to contract for the right
to veto certain transactions does not mean that they are unable to do so. Rather,
the absence of contractual protection for such non-shareholder constituencies
may simply reflect the fact that such constituencies are unwilling to pay for such
protection in the form of lower wages or lower interest rates on debt.
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
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bargaining around the alternative baselines also supports an investorfocused bankruptcy process. Under such a regime, communities and
employees can negotiate for protection individually or collectively if
they are willing to forego wages or other contractual provisions as a
quid pro quo for such protection.
Under a bankruptcy regime that includes significant protection
for non-investor interests, however, bargaining for an alternative
baseline would be much more difficult. Free rider problems would
infect the process of contracting around a stakeholder protective
bankruptcy regime. Because the bankruptcy process provides
protection only indirectly, through manipulation of the asset
deployment decision, 30 opting out of the regime would require the
acquiescence of all affected parties. Protection through this means is
not particularized.'' The retention of bankruptcy protection by one
group of stakeholders would inure to the benefit of all such groups,
even those who have waived the protection.
Consider the perspective of a lender under such a regime.
Obtaining a waiver of bankruptcy protection from the borrower's
labor union only ensures that the union will not assert its claim to
protection. If non-unionized employees, the local community,
consumer groups, suppliers or others affected by the potential closure
of the business can press a claim for its continued operation, the
lender will find that its treatment in bankruptcy remains unaffected
by the labor union's waiver. Of course, since an incomplete waiver
amounts to no waiver, the incomplete waiver will never occur. From
the lender's perspective it would matter little whether most of the
stakeholders had waived their right to protection in bankruptcy.
Lenders would face losses of the same magnitude whether the
liquidation was delayed for the benefit of a few non-investors or
many. Therefore, any waiver would have to be unanimous.
The breadth of parties interested in the failure of a business
would render such a unanimous waiver costly, if not impossible.
Many of such claims for protection arise from reliance on the

REv. 23, 36 (1991).
130. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
131. Protection through other means, such as the special priorities referred to supra
note 74, is particularized. Individual beneficiaries of such protective rules could
theoretically waive the protections individually. As such, a transaction cost analysis of
such rules might augur in favor of their inclusion in the process, assuming that the
protective priorities were cast as non-mandatory, off-the-rack rules. Currently, there is no
method through which the beneficiaries of such protections can waive the benefit of the
priorities ex ante.
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continued existence of the business operation rather than through a
formalized contractual relationship. Even assuming that the process
would recognize a waiver of a claim to protection, problems would
arise with respect to representation and compensation for such a
waiver. These contracting difficulties would, to a large extent, render
a regime that protects non-investor interests in the business mandatory rather than bargained. 32
Free-rider problems might also affect the cost of bargaining
around a creditor-focused bankruptcy regime, but the problem is
likely to be less severe. To the extent that communities, employees
and other non-investor constituencies bargain for a voice in the
bankruptcy process, their exercise of that right might benefit nonparties to the bargain. For example, a small group of non-unionized
employees might bargain for severance pay rights that would give that
group a claim in the bankruptcy of the company. In return, the
company would likely demand wage concessions or other favorable
terms. The employees' exercise of their right to influence the asset
deployment decision would provide benefits to other employees who
also seek to avoid the closure of the business. These positive
externalities would provide some limit on the willingness of all noninvestors to bargain for such rights.
Notwithstanding such a free-rider problem, transaction costs
should remain lower under an investor-focused bankruptcy regime for
two reasons. First, the positive externalities only exist when the
employees with the bargained-for claim choose to use that claim to
advocate an investment decision that benefits them in their capacity
as employees-that is, a decision to continue the operation of the
plant. The employees may eliminate the free-rider problem by
exercising their rights as creditors to participate in the bankruptcy
distribution. In other words, by bargaining for severance pay, the
employees buy two types of protection: the right to influence the
asset deployment decision and the right to participate in bankruptcy
distributions. Only the former carries free-rider problems.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the free-rider problems
associated with this type of bargaining may be reduced by the
formation of bargaining coalitions. In many situations, small groups

132. Rasmussen's intriguing proposal to allow corporations, in their articles of incorporation, to choose the type of bankruptcy regime that will govern their demise does not
suffer from this defect. Under his model, the articles provide a contractual mechanism
through which all of the parties can opt in or out of such a regime. Rasmussen, Debtor's
Choice, supra note 17, at 66.
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of employees would not find it in their interests to bargain for a
substantial voice in the bankruptcy process. The cost of such a voice
would be too high given the inability to particularize the protection.
But all of the company's employees might find that their share of the
cost is worth it to them, even considering that their assertion of the
right may create some positive externalities. Tis the free-rider
problem in this context can be expected to vary with the size of the
bargaining group. In contrast, under the non-investor protective
regime, any substantial reduction in free-rider problems will occur
only when the bargaining coalition approaches unanimity.
Thus, efficiency concerns point in the direction of a bankruptcy
regime that focuses solely on creditor wealth maximization. This
baseline leaves non-investors the ability to bargain for protection
individually or in groups, ensuring maximum flexibility in the
structure of default risk relationships. The alternative would likely
result in mandated protection of non-investor interests because
contracting for a complete waiver of such protections would be
prohibitively expensive.
Of course, this efficiency-oriented analysis implicates some fairly
strong moral arguments. In the view of the strong defender of the
market, the results of the efficiency inquiry might be taken as
conclusive from a moral basis as well. Non-investors would have no
cause to complain that the bankruptcy regime excludes their interests.
Stakeholders have a choice whether to rely on the benefits the
business brings them. Thus, their decision to rely (without the
protection of express contract) brought benefits that compensated
them for the displacement associated with the failure of the business.
By the same token, creditors would have no morally based complaint
that an inclusive bankruptcy policy works a wealth transfer from them
to non-investors. Creditors lending in a legal environment that
protects these interests will adjust their interest rate to compensate for
the additional risk the system imposes upon them. 33
One way of expressing this notion is through the rhetoric of
choice. Goods are distributed throughout society on the basis of
consumers' willingness to commit part of their wealth-including
133. As one commentator has noted:

[T]he anticipated frustration of contractual priority makes such priority less
attractive to investors and deprives them of the full advantage of priority

contracts. For example if a high priority creditor anticipated the possibility of
making concessions in bankruptcy reorganization, it might expend resources to
monitor a firm and protect its interest in anticipation of bankruptcy.
Adler, Financialand Political Theories,supra note 17, at 317.
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individual endowments of skills-to the purchase of those goods.
Insurance against financial catastrophe in the form of claims against
the failed firm can be profitably analyzed as a type of good that
employees and communities could buy.
That this approach is controversial is an understatement. Critics
of the market system would note that markets can achieve distributive
justice only if the initial allocation of goods and abilities that the
market values is just."M The market vindicates only preferences
backed by wealth. What counts as wealth is, in turn, determined by
the market. Wealth in the view of the economists includes not only
material wealth but also endowments of skill recognized to be of
worth to others. 3 5 Therefore, if the initial distribution of wealth,
including skills valued in the market, cannot be justified on moral
grounds, allowing free transfer of wealth through the market might
not result in a just outcome. 6
Injustice in the initial distribution of wealth can be viewed as a
direct answer to the rhetoric of choice. The poor in society do not
possess the necessary wealth to make effective choices. This lack of
"choice" undermines the legitimacy of the ex ante bargain by making
us less sure that the non-investors have been adequately compensated
for the risk of loss. Markets cannot work to distribute risk unless all
of the participants are free to bargain. Freedom to bargain necessarily implies that each party can make credible threats, including a
threat to leave the bargaining table. The community and employee
may not have the wealth necessary to make their voices heard in the
bargaining process. On this view, bankruptcy may be seen as an
appropriate means of correcting this imbalance in bargaining power.13
134. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 310-15 (1971); see also ALLEN
BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 64-78 (1985) (criticizing on
distributive grounds Nosick's moral case for the market); ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY
AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 65-87 (1975) (noting the disparities in wealth and
income that remain unaddressed by the market); Anthony T. Kronman, ContractLaw and
DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 475-97 (1980) (arguing that contract law must be
used to achieve distributional goals if it is to be morally acceptable).
135. According to Rawls, "No one supposes that when someone's abilities are less in
demand or have deteriorated ... his moral deservingness undergoes a similar shift."
RAWLS, supra note 134, at 311.
136. Rawls further states, "The distributive shares that result [from a system that
awards premiums based upon scarce natural talent] do not correlate with moral worth,
since the initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and
nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view." Id. at 311-12.
137. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 19, at 558.
A related criticism of the market view is that individuals may not understand that
their best interests require some protection against financial failure. Heuristic biases may
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In the related context of plant closing decisions and corporate
takeovers, distributive motives have led some commentators to
advocate the imposition of a mandatory rule protecting the interests
of non-investors. For example, Duncan Kennedy has advocated the
imposition of a mandatory term in employment contracts that would
require companies to convey idle assets to the union in trust for the
workers." 8 Similarly, Joseph Singer has argued that legal protection
of the reliance interest should be extended to the employee/employer
relationship in the context of plant closings.'3 9 In the corporate
takeover arena, several commentators have recommended expanding
directors' duties to include a duty to consider the effect of substantial
4
corporate changes on a variety of non-investor constituencies.'
A bankruptcy regime protective of the interests of non-investor
constituencies would impose a redistributive device similar to that
proposed by these commentators. Under such a regime, credit
contracts would include a mandatory term alleviating the harshness of
strict enforcement in the event of general financial failure. Such a
term would create rights benefitting non-investors beyond those
created by their contractual or tort-based relationship with the firm.
Against an existing social and legal regime that grants primacy to the

result in their systematic underestimation of risk, resulting in a failure to bargain for
protection. Thus, paternalistic motivations may weigh in favor of protecting non-investors
in the event of failure. Such protection would be justified even though the rule may result
in the lowering of wages or the reduction of employment levels. See Duncan Kennedy,
Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contractand Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower,41 MD. L. REv. 563, 624-31 (1982).
138. Kennedy, supra note 137, at 629-31.
139. Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 724-32
(1988). Both Kennedy and Singer were writing in response to the situation presented by
United Steel Workers of Am. Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'4, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). In United Steel Workers, the steel
workers union claimed an easement in the obsolete and unprofitable millworks at
Youngstown and Mahoning Valley, Ohio. The basis for the claim was the local
community's historical dependence on steel manufacturing and representations that, if the
employees made the plants profitable, they would not close. The union sought an
injunction against the closure of the plants or, in the alternative, an injunction requiring
U.S. Steel to sell the plants to the plaintiffs. The court held that the union had no contract
or property right to such relief. Id. at 11.
140. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1986); David Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 265-67 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
PracticalFrameworkfor Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. Ruv. 579,
584 (1992); Marleen A. O'Conner, Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a FiduciaryDuty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1194
(1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State NonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 48-49 (1991).
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notion of freedom of contract, such a mandatory term finds its
justification in the desire to call off freedom of contract to serve
distributional aims. 4'
B. The PracticalDimension: Achieving DistributionalEnds Through
Bankruptcy Policy
It is pointless to debate the desired ends of a legal institution
without developing a sense of whether the institution under study is
capable of achieving those ends. It is not my aim to make the
definitive case for or against redistributive urgings. For purposes of
this Article, we may assume that these goals are desirable. The
importance of understanding the moral justifications for a
redistributive bankruptcy policy lies principally in the practical
questions such justifications generate.
A decision to redistribute entitlements through the bankruptcy
process raises two principal concerns.
Initially, because the
redistributive policy is likely to result in allocational inefficiencies, the
process must enable the decisionmaker to understand and control the
level of redistribution.'42
Some businesses encounter financial
difficulty simply because their products can no longer compete with
alternative products. Keeping those businesses alive through a
redistributive bankruptcy policy represents a social cost for the period
of time during which the resources are kept from their most highly
valued uses. Given imperfect information, any reorganization process
will preserve corporations beyond their economic lifespan and will let
die corporations that could be saved if only their financial troubles
could be resolved. While both types of errors are undesirable, an

141. While most critics of the economic approach to bankruptcy policy espouse
concerns grounded in distributive justice, see supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text,

some of Carlson's rhetoric seems to speak the language of corrective justice, see supra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Although this Article is not directly responsive to
those who view corporate law as creating a license in the capitalist to exploit workers and
communities, the institutional competence arguments presented infra notes 144-221 and
accompanying text, apply with equal force. Asserting that the structure of bankruptcy law
enables capital contributors to steal away the labors of loyal workers in a way that cries
out for a rectification of the resulting moral imbalance says little about the institution's
capability to accomplish such a correction. The fluidity of capital markets renders it
unlikely that bankruptcy courts can achieve corrective justice by placing more of the costs
on the capitalists. As demonstrated infra notes 144-72 and accompanying text, capital
markets will simply pass much of the costs of the correction on to others.
142. Much of the economic scholarship seems to be principally concerned with this
problem. See Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 17, at 464-79 (providing an expansive
analysis of the potential costs of a redistributive regime).
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incorporation of redistributive goals in the bankruptcy system makes
it more likely that the process will shore dying businesses beyond
their efficient lives.
How much of this type of error we should
tolerate depends on how strongly we embrace redistributive goals.
An equally serious problem raised by redistributive policies is
defining the group that will ultimately bear the cost of the
redistributions. Even if one concludes that some allocative efficiency
can be sacrificed in the interest of a more just distribution of the costs
of failure, a decision to depart from market-based risk allocations
requires consideration of the incidence of redistributive cost. It is this
problem that most clearly illustrates the inadequacies of the
bankruptcy process.
How broadly or narrowly to spread the cost of an inclusive
bankruptcy regime must, in the first instance, depend on the goals
underlying its departure from contractual solutions. Without some
means of determining who bears the cost of the protective provisions,
satisfying the goals underlying the policy is a matter of happenstance.
A bankruptcy policy intended to soak the wealthy capitalists in favor
of the worker could have the disastrous effect of causing business
closings (and their attendant dislocation) in wholly unrelated areas.
We might, therefore, discover that the policy effects a transfer from
worker to worker rather than from capitalist to worker.' 4
An analysis of distributional goals cannot end with moral
arguments regarding the desirability of wealth redistributions. Once
the desirability of such transfers is established, the analysis must
consider whether the institution under study is capable of realizing
such goals. As illustrated earlier, our current bankruptcy process is
ill-suited to the task. The remainder of the Article demonstrates the
inability of any judicial process to come to grips with the questions
raised by bankruptcy redistributional policies.
IV. PROBLEMS INDETERMINING THE INCIDENCE OF
REDISTRIBUTIVE COST
Determining who would bear the cost of protecting non-investor
interests in the bankruptcy process is likely to be an extremely
complex, if not impossible, task. The cost of allocative inefficiency
143. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text; see also Michelle J. White, Does
Chapter 11 Save Economically Inefficient Firms?, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1319, 1339 (1994)
(providing a game theoretic model that shows that the current design of the bankruptcy
process is likely to result in the reorganization of economically inefficient firms).
144. See Rasmussen, Social Justice, supra note 63, at 39.
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created by a redistributive bankruptcy system will be spread in at least
two ways. First, the cost will be spread through increases in the cost
of capital as investors adjust their required returns in response to the
possible redistributions. 45 Second, some of the cost may be borne
by industry competitors as the bankruptcy process maintains businesses in industries suffering from overcapacity. 4 6 The results of
both types of loss spreading are difficult to predict.
Determining the incidence, of redistributive cost raises complex
theoretical and empirical problems that push and pull toward differing
conclusions. We cannot pretend to have the necessary data even to
begin the process of determining the economy-wide effects of the
existing regime, much less to predict the ultimate consequences of a
regime that more explicitly incorporates the interests of non-investor
constituencies. It may be true that the allocational efficiency losses
created by the protection of non-investor interests are spread across
a broad base (and justified as a form of social insurance) or borne by
the wealthiest members of society (and justified as a method of wealth
redistribution). It may also be true that the cost of bankruptcy
redistributive policies falls principally on those least able to bear the
burden.
Of course, it is more likely that the answer lies somewhere in
between, but without substantially more data, it is difficult to make
strong claims regarding the incidence of redistributive cost. It is not,
however, necessary to an institutional analysis that such strong claims
be made. It is enough to illustrate the types of information problems
the institution is likely to encounter in accomplishing redistributive
goals. Accordingly, the following discussion is intended to illustrate
some of the competing considerations involved in determining the
incidence of redistributive cost.
A. Redistributive Policies and the Cost of Capital
If employees and communities have a recognizable interest in
keeping the business operating, the cost of protecting that interest will
be borne, in the first instance, by the capital providers of the
business. 47 But we cannot simply assume that the cost of such a

145. See infra notes 147-64 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
146. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
147. In analyzing the protection afforded retirees by § 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Keating observed, "The fundamental flaw with § 1114 is that it attempts to create new
wealth where none exists. Since bankruptcy is by nature a zero-sum game, the granting
of new priorities to one class will necessarily reduce the return to other classes." Daniel
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regime will stop there. Capital markets specialize in understanding
and controlling risk. While the interjection of the community or
public interest provides a new challenge to the capital providers by
placing another risk into the equation, there is little reason to believe
that the market could not price this risk."4
Capital markets' ability to price risk dramatically affects the
analysis, however. Through pricing, the markets may distribute
further the costs of non-investor protection. The introduction of the
community and employee interests into the bankruptcy system will
create a non-controllable risk in every investment contract: the risk
that the investor will be forced to invest in negative net present value
projects.149 The introduction of this risk can be expected to increase

the cost of capital as firms are unable to make credible commitments
that capital may be withdrawn from the project. 5 '
An increase in the cost of capital in turn will have an effect on
firm decisions regarding either the price and output of its product or
its demand and the price paid for its inputs. If firms face a demand
curve for their products and a supply curve for all other factors of
production that are not significantly altered by the protective term,
the increase in cost can only result in some restriction in output
coupled with a reduction in payments to other inputs. The firm faces
a zero sum game with respect to its operations, and we cannot expect
to eliminate the costs of producing goods and services by
redistributing the risks of failure.'

Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114: Congress' Empty Response to the Retiree Plight,67 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 17, 47 (1993).
148. According to Warren, "Bankruptcy involves risk distribution among private
parties. But the risk that a debtor will fail, and that loan collection will be accomplished
through bankruptcy, is something that private parties can certainly price." Elizabeth
Warren, Why Have a FederalBankruptcy System?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1093,1096 (1992).

149. As illustrated supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text, a bankruptcy regime that
allows the judge to extend the reorganization for the benefit of non-investor constituencies
effectively forces objecting creditors to invest in a project that they have determined to
have a negative net present value. While it is an empirical question, no reason exists to
believe that creditors systematically undervalue such investments. As Judge Easterbrook
has explained, investors are subject to competition. Those who misvalue assets will not
survive. See In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus,
the net effect of this forced investment therefore can be expected to increase the losses
lenders will experience in bankruptcy cases.
150. See Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppek The
"Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CiII. L. REv. 903, 944 (1985) (criticizing Kennedy's analysis
for ignoring this economic reality).
151. See Keating, supra note 147, at 47.
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To those who are willing to tolerate some allocative inefficiency
in furtherance of distributional goals, an increase in the cost of capital
may not seem particularly troublesome. 2 Ideally a redistributive
bankruptcy policy would result in the production of fewer (perhaps
slightly fewer) toasters and televisions together with a slight increase
in the price of such items. The economy may contract slightly, but if
the cost of contraction would be borne across a wide sector of society,
it might be a small price to pay for the benefit of more employee and
community security.
The difficulty with this argument is that it assumes that the cost
of employee and community protection will be spread across the
broadest possible base. Broad redistribution of the cost of
redistribution incorporates requirements that are unlikely to exist in
practice. First, broad redistribution requires that capital providers
remain ignorant of varying levels of risk across industry and
geographic sectors. Second, the approach explicitly assumes that noninvestor protection will have no significant impact on the supply and
demand relationships governing factors of production other than
capital. Finally, broad redistribution requires that none of the costs
of ex post redistributions will be shifted to industry competitors. In
practice none of these requirements are likely to be achieved.
B. Targeted Increases in CapitalCosts
Assuming that the cost of bankruptcy redistributions will be
spread across a broad base requires that one further assume that
lenders will increase the cost of credit uniformly over all loans. Such
an overall increase would increase the cost of producing goods and
services somewhat uniformly and no one industry or geographic area
would bear a disproportionate share of the burden. Of course, the
credit market cannot be expected to remain blind to differing levels
of risk among companies, industries and geographic areas. Lenders
specialize in discerning differences in the relative risk of enterprises.
Their ability to adjust the cost of credit to reflect the increased cost
of failure may result in those companies located within industries that
are in the worst financial situation bearing most of the cost of the
redistributive policy." Inasmuch as employees and communities
152. See Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 19, at 338 ("If the inquiry over
bankruptcy policy becomes nothing more than a debate over allocative efficiency, it will
pass over crucial elements of the policy scheme that cannot be so neatly tied up in
economic models.").
153. See Rasmussen, Social Justice, supra note 63, at 20.
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dependent on these industries are the intended beneficiaries of the
policy, redistributive goals may not be achieved.
Consider such beleaguered industries as the steel or oil industries
during the 1980s or the airline industry today. Redistributive
bankruptcy policies would raise the risk of lending to companies in
such industries and limit their ability to secure capital on a costeffective basis. Because the long-range survival of these businesses
may depend on the availability of capital for modernization and
adaptation to changing preferences, the net effect of a redistributive
term may be harmful to precisely those groups it is intended to
benefit.
The reaction of lenders to an increase in the losses created by a
redistributive bankruptcy policy might also affect a wide variety of
risky enterprises. Start-up and high-tech businesses might find
necessary funding unavailable or excessively costly. In short, a policy
designed to protect workers and communities in one sector of the
economy may simply redistribute wealth to those groups from the
workers and communities who would have benefitted from a new
business that failed from want of capital.'
Section 1110 of the Code"5 and the legislative history surrounding that section provide a case in point. Section 1110 requires that
the trustee of an airline debtor cure defaults and agree to perform the
obligations under certain leases of or purchase money obligations for,
aircraft and spare parts within sixty days of the initiation of a
bankruptcy case. If the trustee fails to cure the defaults and make the
required agreement within this time, the automatic stay is no longer
applicable to the lender who is then free to foreclose on the equipment.'56 In this way, the provision relieves the aircraft lender from
the burden of delay inherent in Chapter 11 by limiting the ability of
others to keep those assets invested in what the lender believes to be
an investment with negative net present value.
In the legislative history to the predecessor to section 1110,'"

154. See Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection,supra note 18, at 102 ("Keeping a firm
in one town from closing may have the indirect effect of keeping a new one in a different

town from opening.").
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994).

156. For a more detailed analysis of the operation of § 1110, see James W. Giddens &
Sandor E. Schick, Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code: Time for Refueling?, 64 AM.
BANKR. L. REV. 109 (1990); Sandor E. Schick, When Airlines Crash: Section 1110

Revisited, 48 Bus. LAW. 277 (1992).
157. Section 116(5) of the Bankruptcy Act provided that the right of lessors and
conditional sellers of aircraft, engines, propellers, appliances, and spare parts to take
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Congress made clear that the motivation for the provision was to
ensure that airlines would have access to the capital needed to
purchase new equipment. 8 Congress was concerned principally
that small airlines were having difficulty attracting capital to expand
and renovate their fleets and that such a provision benefitting
equipment lenders would allow increased access to capital at a lower
cost.'59 The airline industry supported the inclusion of section 1110
in the Bankruptcy Code,"6 and several airlines have appeared as
amici curiae supporting a broad interpretation of the statute in
litigation regarding the provision's reach. 6 '
The positive reaction of the airline industry to provisions
benefiting its lenders should give pause to advocates of a protective
bankruptcy policy. Companies outside of bankruptcy may be harmed
by a bankruptcy regime that enables managers of companies in
bankruptcy to delay the process. Provisions limiting the ability of
managers to use delay as a method of redistributing the losses
resulting from financial failure may be necessary to reduce the cost of
credit capital to a level that will ensure continued expansion and
renovation.
C. Changes in Firm Demand for Non-Capital Inputs
A second factor affecting the breadth of redistribution is the
effect redistributive bankruptcy policies may have on a firm's
decisions regarding the mix of capital and labor. A redistributive
approach to bankruptcy may reduce the firm's demand for inputs
(such as labor) that carry the highest redistributive cost.' 62 If the
possession of the property would not be affected by the provisions of Chapter X of the
Act. Pub. L. No. 85-295, 71 Stat. 617 (1957) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1110),
reprintedin 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 681.
158. H.R. REP. No. 944, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1926-27.
159. See id.
160. See Letter from Leo Seybold, Vice President, Federal Affairs, Air Transport
Association of America, to Honorable Dennis DeConcini (Nov. 29, 1977), reprinted in
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in
the JudicialMachinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 933
(1978).
161. See In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282,285 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Pan Am
Corp., 125 B.R. 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). Both the Continentaland Pan Am litigation
concerned the question of whether the protections afforded lenders under § 1110 extended
to lenders involved in sale-leaseback transactions of aircraft. The airline amici took the
position that such lenders should be protected by § 1110. See Continental,932 F.2d at 285.
162. See McKenzie, supra note 7, at 217 ("[W]hen firms do invest in this country, they
will, because of severance pay requirements, be inclined to substitute capital for labor.
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interests of employees are to be valued in the bankruptcy process, it
stands to reason that there would be some direct relationship between
the number of employees and the amount of redistribution the
process entails. To the extent that this relationship holds, firms with
higher levels of employment may find their cost of capital increased
disproportionately. This increase may create an incentive to
substitute capital for labor in an effort to reduce the potential cost of
failure to their lenders."6
Communities may face similar problems. To the extent that
bankruptcy policy protects communities' interests in the continued
operation of a plant, corporations may avoid close relationships with
communities likely to develop a dependency on the business. Indeed
firms may find that the increased cost of capital. associated with
community dependency is enough to tip the scale in favor of locating
operations away from poorer areas."4 Location in poor communities may increase the chance that a bankruptcy judge may limit
the ability to close the plant. Like the situation facing the employees,
the greater the dependency, the higher the value likely to be placed
on community interest. Lenders perceiving this threat may choose to
increase the cost of loans to businesses in such areas.
Thus, with respect to both employees and communities, the
breadth of redistribution may be affected significantly by substitution
of inputs that are less likely to tug at the heartstrings of the decisionmaker. Surely an automated plant with 100 employees that is located
in a wealthy suburb of New York presents a much less compelling
case for loss redistribution than does a labor-intensive plant located
in a poor community in the Rust Belt. Understanding this, bankers
may adjust the cost of credit accordingly. Firms, in turn, may adjust

.. "); Rasmussen, Social Justice,supra note 63, at 20 ("A bankruptcy redistribution to the

least advantaged results in nothing more than a tax on those individuals who choose to
deal with persons worse off than themselves.").
163. Because capital and labor are substitute inputs to production, one might argue that
an increase in the cost of capital would result in an increased demand for labor. See
RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR E3CONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 66-69 (2d ed. 1985). But to the extent that firms are better able to

assure lenders that the redistributive effect of a bankruptcy is reduced in firms that are
capital intensive, the effect may be an increase in capital. Thus the cost of redistributive
bankruptcy policies may be more appropriately thought of as a cost of labor rather than
a cost of capital.
164. See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm Specific Capital Investments, and the
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 198-99;
Rasmussen, Social Justice, supra note 63, at 20, 27-31.
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their location and mix of capital and labor in an effort to reduce their
capital costs.
D. Industry-Wide Effects of Redistributive Policies
The effect of bankruptcy redistributive policies on the competitors of the business undergoing a reorganization may dramatically
affect the breadth of redistribution. Forcing lenders to subsidize
continued operations of businesses that, but for the subsidy, would
cease operations artificially maintains the supply of the goods or
services produced. Such allocative inefficiency not only will result in
an increase in the cost of capital as lenders respond to the subsidy
but, in individual cases, may result in damage to other corporations
in the industry.
Again, the airline industry provides a useful example of how
inclusive bankruptcy policies may result in redistributions that place
the cost of non-investor protection onto other firms in the same
industry. During the first three years of the 1990s the industry lost
over $10 billion.'6 These losses occurred during a time when a
number of large carriers (including Pan Am, TWA, and Eastern) were
operating under Chapter 11. Several industry representatives have
laid a portion of the blame for the industry's losses on the bankruptcy
process.' 6 Reports of one study state that $3 billion of the total
industry losses can be linked to competition from Chapter 11
carriers. 1 7
Claims of industry executives that the industry's woes are solely
the result of the Chapter 11 process should, of course, be treated with
some suspicion. After all, prompt liquidation of bankrupt carriers
works to the advantage of carriers who manage to avoid bankruptcy.
But even if it is difficult to make the case that Chapter 11 is entirely

165. Kenneth Labich, What Will Save the U.S. Airlines, FoRTUNE, June 14, 1993, at 98.
166. "'The industry's constant price wars have deprived it of the ability to balance costs
and revenues.., and it is the bankrupt and overleveraged airlines that are leading prices
downward.' " Airline Executives Wrangle Over Need to Overhaul Bankruptcy Rules, 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1619, at 741-42 (June 17, 1993) (statement of
Robert Crandall, Chairman of American Airlines). Crandall also alleged that "[t]he
Chapter 11 carriers have initiated 55% of all fare reductions during the past 12 months."
ld. at 742.
167. See Viewpoint: 'Airline Bankruptcy Virus Must Be Stopped,' AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., May 3, 1993, at 66 (quoting study by Aviation Forecasting & Economics);

Stephen Solomon, The Bully of the Skies Cries Uncle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993, § 6
(Magazine), at 13.
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to blame for the airline industry's decline,"6 it is possible that the
extension of time spent in Chapter 11 by bankrupt carriers artificially
maintained capacity in an industry already plagued by excess seats.
More importantly, management of bankrupt businesses may have
an incentive to engage in pricing strategies that would not be pursued
by companies outside of bankruptcy. Once a company becomes
insolvent, it is in the interest of its shareholders to undertake
investments that have a remote likelihood of success but a high
payoff 69 Low pricing may be viewed as such an investment.
Desperate to prolong the life of a dying company, shareholders might
urge management to price the company's goods and services low
enough to maintain the business in the short term-even if the cost
is longer term operating losses. After all, since the alternative to
operation is a liquidation in which the creditors will not be paid in
full, the funding for such losses would come from the creditors.
This incentive raises a familiar problem in a new light. A
redistributive bankruptcy provision causes asset deployment decisions
such as pricing to be disconnected from the creditors whose capital is
at risk in the decision. 7 ' If the bankruptcy process is made to
protect a' wide range of interests, creditors may find their voice to be
less than effective. At least in the short term, industry competitors
and their dependents may bear some of the cost of such protection as
they are forced to match the pricing of the bankrupt business or lose
customers.7
Targeted increases in the cost of credit capital, the substitution
of inputs to the production process and the industry-wide effects of
maintaining failing companies all render any broad distribution of the
costs of non-investor protection unlikely. Further, these reactions to
168. Several airline industry executives point to more general economic problems, such
as the effect of the Gulf War and a failure to enforce the antitrust laws, as being the
primary cause for the losses experienced by the industry. Labich, supra note 165, at 99.
The Clinton Administration seems to have struck something of a middle ground. The
administration has commissioned the National Economic Council to study the effects of
limiting the exclusivity period for Chapter 11 companies while endorsing the provisions of
Senate Bill 540 (the Senate version of what has now been enacted as the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994) that would limit the time that airlines have to decide whether to
assume or reject terminals, gates, and related facility leases. DAILY REP. FOR EXECS.

(BNA), at 1-2 (Jan. 7, 1994) (statement of Transportation Secretary Pena).
169. See supra notes 99-100, 114 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.

171. Delta airlines estimated that it lost $700 million from 1988 through 1991 trying to
match Eastern's low fares during Eastern's final years of operation. See Edward H.
Phillips, Congress Backs Reform of Airline Bankruptcy Law, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., May 30, 1994, at 58.
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the protection of employee and community interests in the bankruptcy
process may make it impossible to determine who bears the cost of
the redistributive policy. The cost may be borne by the individuals
and communities that the policy is intended to protect. Alternatively,
the cost may fall disproportionately on employees and communities
dependent on competitors or on the dependents of other risky
businesses.
It is not nearly enough to say that the interests of employees and
communities are deserving of protection-they may be. But moving
from abstraction to practice requires much more than wishful
thinking. It requires an understanding of the possible effects of the
decision. This Article suggests only a few possible directions in which
a bankruptcy regime designed to protect community and employee
interests may take the rest of the economy. Doubtless there are many
more factors that will influence the cost of capital in a world in which
One thing can be said
such non-investor interests are recognized.
with a high level of certainty, however. Predicting the effects of
redistributive policies will be an extraordinarily inexact undertaking.
V.

BANKRUPTCY REDISTRIBUTIONS AND THE LIMITS OF THE

JUDICIAL PROCESS
Regardless of the strength of our commitment to achieving a just
distribution of wealth in society, we must pay close attention to the
abilities and limitations of the institutions chosen to reach such goals.
The information problems accompanying bankruptcy redistributions
present a practical obstacle to the realization of redistributive goals in
the process. This section examines the institutional features of the
bankruptcy judicial process that limit its ability to accomplish such
redistributions in a rational way.
172. The increase in the cost of capital may be offset by other beneficial effects of the
bankruptcy system. Gertner and Scharfstein have argued that Chapter l's effect on
efficiency is ambiguous. Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and
the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1209-15 (1991). In support of this
proposition, they offer a theoretical model of bankruptcy that takes account of
bankruptcy's effects on the problem of under-investment as well as over-investment. Id.
at 1192-99.
The possibility of efficiency gains of the type posited by Gertner and Scharfstein does
not, however, undermine the analysis here. Efficiency gains in particular cases turn on
whether the firm in question would have inefficiently under- or over-invested outside of
bankruptcy. ld. at 1192. In Gertner and Scharfstein's view, this question depends on the

financial structure of the firm. It does not turn on the amount of redistribution to noninvestors the system causes. Thus a redistributive bankruptcy scheme would likely ask the
wrong questions to take advantage fully of potential efficiency gains.
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Legal process theorists have long warned of the dangers inherent
in the use of adjudication to achieve social policies." Focusing on
the nature of the judicial process and its limitations, these theorists
attempt to articulate some division of power, principally between the
courts and the legislature. Arguments for limitations on the use of
judicial power to effect social change often focus on questions of
legitimacy. 74 Federal judges do not answer to the will of the
governed. Insulation from the prevailing political winds is a desirable
attribute of the judicial process in fulfilling its traditional functions of
adjudication of disputes and protection of the minority against the
But once judges move across some
tyranny of the majority.
(usually ill-defined) boundary into the realm of promoting social
policy, their independence robs them of legitimacy. 76
Questions of legitimacy do not loom large in the bankruptcy
debate, however. As illustrated above, bankruptcy decisions are not
expressly redistributive.'" The fact-driven nature of the process is
such that most of its redistributive character derives from the judges'
attitudes in making close factual calls regarding asset deployment
decisions. 78 Thus we cannot say with any certainty whether judges
are going beyond the dictates of the Code to embrace broader social
policies in ways that implicate legitimacy concerns. Of course, any
lingering concerns over legitimacy could be directly addressed by
legislative authorization to consider the interests of non-investors in
making these close calls.

173. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 298 (1977);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 343 (1991); Lillian R. BeVier, JudicialRestraintAnArgumentfrom Institutional
Design, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 10-12 (1994); Lino A. Graglia, Do Judges Have
a Policy-Making Role in the American System of Government?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 119, 124-27 (1994).
174. See BeVier, supra note 173, at 10; Graglia, supra note 173, at 124-30; David L.
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures,and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REv. 519, 555-58 (1988).
175. Shapiro, supra note 174, at 555-56.
176. As one commentator opined:
A problem with governmental power to enact "good" social policies without
popular consent is that it necessarily includes the power to enact "bad" social
policies without popular consent. Even more fundamentally, the essence of a
system of government based on the consent of the governed is that the question
of whether a social policy is "good" gets answered by the governed.
Graglia, supra note 173, at 124.
177. See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
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A. Polycentric Problems and the Practical Limits of the Judicial
Process
Of more interest here are the insights of the legal process
theorists who focus on the pragmatic capabilities of the process to
effect social change. Fuller described problems such as those involved
in spreading the social costs of financial failure as polycentric,
179
involving many possible outcomes, each affecting different actors.
Like a spider's web, decisions regarding economic allocations involve
many centers for distributing the tension caused by a single tug.' °
The web analogy is particularly apt in the corporate context. Modem
financial theory describes the firm as the nexus for a complex web of
contracts under which factors of production are amassed and risks and
A change in one of the contracts will
rewards are distributed.'
have unpredictable effects in the way risks and returns are distributed
throughout the enterprise. Complicating the problem further is the
fact that the centers include risk/return relationships wholly unrelated
to those in the failed enterprise. Bankruptcy decisions intended to
protect the interests of a broad range of constituencies entail
economy-wide effects that go beyond those concerning the participants in the particular enterprise.Y2
A number of limitations on the judicial process render it less
capable than other institutions of responding to highly polycentric
problems." The judicial process is designed to elicit information
It focuses on what has
regarding past acts or relationships."
occurred between the parties before it rather than on what might
occur in the future. This limitation is captured in the oft-noted
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts. Adjudicative
facts are those that concern the immediate parties to the dispute,

179. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,394404 (1978).
180. Id. at 395.
181. The seminal paper is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).

182. See supra notes 145-68 and accompanying text.
183. To be precise, Fuller's point was that "adjudication" (rather than the judicial
process) is ill-suited to the resolution of polycentric problems. Fuller, supra note 179, at
393-405. The distinction is no cause for concern, however. Fuller defined "adjudication"
as a process that allows affected parties to participate through presentation of proofs and
reasoned argument. Id. at 363-65. Thus defined, the judicial process is a subset of Fuller's
broader category of adjudication.
184. BeVier, supra note 173, at 11.
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while legislative facts are those that form the basis for the creation of
social policy.'" Unlike adjudicative facts, legislative facts often turn
on assumptions regarding future behavior that are difficult to ascertain-particularly given restrictive rules of evidence and procedure
thought necessary for more traditional types of judicial functions.' 6
In addition to the problem of limited fact gathering capabilities,
the judicial process suffers from other procedural and remedial
limitations. Judicial decisionmaking focuses on resolving disputes
regarding rights of parties before the court. One implication of this
seemingly benign statement is the limit that such focus places on
remedial possibilities. Framing issues as involving rights seems
naturally to lead to outcomes that Shapiro has described as having an
"on/off" quality.'"
Polycentric problems, on the other hand,
typically have a wide range of possible solutions, each involving tradeoffs between competing values.'" Another implication of the focus
on "rights" is that it provides conceptual barriers to experimentation
and monitoring of result by the judiciary. Having declared a right,
courts are likely loath to institute oversight to determine whether
granting the right was a good idea from a broad social perspective.189
The polycentric nature of social problems such as school
funding,'90 police behavior,' 9 ' prison reform, 92 juvenile

185. See Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problemsof Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942). Horowitz captures the same dichotomy
through the terms "social" and "historical" facts. HOROWITZ, supra note 173, at 45.
186. HOROWIrZ, supra note 173, at 47-51. Horowitz notes the difficulties likely to be
encountered in operating a dual system of evidence: one set of rules for historical facts
and another for social facts. Id at 49.
187. Shapiro, supra note 174, at 553.
188. Fuller, supra note 179, at 393-95. Fuller uses the analogy of the problem of
assigning players to positions on a football team. There are a large number of possible
outcomes, and the position of any one player has carryover effects on the optimal position
for all of the other players. Id. at 395. The judicial process is likely to disregard many of
these effects if the question is cast as whether a particular player has a "right" to a
particular position.
189. See Shapiro, supra note 174, at 555.
190. HOROWrrz, supra note 173, at 106-70 (analyzing Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), affdsub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969),further
relief ordered,Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), a school desegregation
case from the Washington, D.C. school district that "recognized the right to equal
distribution of school resources within a single school district").
191. HOROWITZ, supra note 173, at 220-54 (analyzing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (extending the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional searches and seizures to state
proceedings)); ROSENBERG, supra note 173, at 316-24 (same).
192. ROSENBERG, supra note 173, at 305-14.
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justice" and problems involving the political process... combines
with the practical limitations on the judicial process to produce
skepticism regarding the judiciary's capacity to effect change in these
areas. Economic questions, such as those presented in bankruptcy
and other corporate law cases, also present substantially polycentric
problems due to the fluidity of capital markets and their ability to
adjust to changes in legal regimes. 9
B. Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Bankruptcy Process.
Bankruptcy is, in the main, a judicial process much like any
other. Many of the problems bankruptcy judges must resolve present
relatively straightforward factual, legal, and interpretative issues.
Bankruptcy judges decide substantive issues of contract, tort, and
property in the course of any business bankruptcy. The presence of
Chapter 11 adds another dimension to the judges' task, however. The
continued operation of the business during a Chapter 11 coupled with
96
the need to provide some control over the negotiation process
implicate numerous administrative issues that, in turn, lead to factsoaked inquiries97 involving data that are subject to a wide range of
interpretations.)
1. The Judicial Character of Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies
These two dimensions to the bankruptcy judicial process again
illustrate the two possible methods through which redistributive goals
might be pursued. 9 ' First, Congress could legislate direct changes
in entitlements. The priorities granted to particular classes of
creditors provide a contemporary example of such redistributive
legislation. 199 Where legislation or judicial decision directly changes
the property rights of various parties, it may effect a redistribution
without burdening the judiciary with the need to make such

193. See HOROWITZ, supra note 173, at 171-219 (analyzing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41
(1967) (affording juveniles the right to counsel in delinquency hearings)); ROSENBERG,
supra note 173, at 314-16 (same).
194. See HOROWTZ, supra note 173, at 68-105.
195. See id. at 46 ("If a court refuses to enforce against a bankrupt corporation an

'unconscionable contract' for the repayment of borrowed money, will that make it more

difficult for firms needing credit to obtain it and perhaps precipitate more such
bankruptcies?").
196. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text for an example.
198. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 74.
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judgments. For example, a legislative enactment that merely shifted
the priority of various types of claims would cause a redistribution
without implicating the judicial process concerns expressed here.
Enactments of this type would not require the judge to balance
competing equities but instead would simply provide rules for dividing
up the assets of the estate and, as such, are not objectionable on the
bases set forth in this Article.
What is lost in this approach to redistribution, however, is an
ability to individually tailor redistributive decisions to the needs of the
parties involved in the actual casesm ° An alternative method of
accomplishing redistributive goals is to change the process in ways
that have the effect of skewing asset deployment decisions toward
reorganization in marginal cases. While this method avoids the
tailoring problems inherent in more direct redistributive enactments,
it directly implicates the judicial process concerns that follow.
It is often difficult to distinguish legal rules that directly change
substantive rights from those that attempt to effect redistributions
through changes in the process. Standing alone, even the legislative
denial of interest to undersecured claimants"° does not clearly
provide any redistribution of the risk of financial failure. The
decision that under-secured creditors are not entitled to compensation
for the time value of their right to foreclose does not, by itself carry
any distributional consequences. It is only when the rule is coupled
with the delay inherent in the reorganization process that the
redistributive effect arises.' This redistributive effect lies principally in the rule's influence on asset deployment decisions.
The indirect nature of such redistributive policies requires us to
consider the bankruptcy process on the level of the individual
bankruptcy court and bankruptcy case. Because redistributions occur
in the context of administering an individual case, decisions that arise
are likely to have little precedential effect. A bankruptcy judge
making a decision to extend the exclusivity period can derive little
guidance from other cases. The need to tailor outcomes to specific
cases is also likely to reduce redistribution-oriented legislative changes
to the bankruptcy process to a fairly vague authorization for the

200. This problem is not, howevef, a complete basis for objection to such bankruptcy
related priorities. A small degree of poorly tailored protection may be better than none
at all.
201. See United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 382

(1988), discussed supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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judiciary to consider the interests of the non-investor constituencies.'
Statutes intended to alter the balance of power between
competing constituencies in the process are unlikely to be selfexecuting. They will continue to leave vast discretion in the
bankruptcy judge because of the fact-specific nature of bankruptcy
cases.' 4 Thus, in large part the burden of determining the amount
of redistribution and who will bear the cost of non-investor protection
will fall on bankruptcy judges.' s
In some ways the bankruptcy judicial process might appear to be
a uniquely qualified institution to pursue such policies. The
bankruptcy process differs from other judicial proceedings in that it
is intended to effect a global settlement of all of the controversies
surrounding a failed business. The process provides voice to a wide
range of affected persons, allowing them to pursue their interests in
a single forum and allowing the decisionmaker to consider a wide
range of possible solutions. Bankruptcy judges are specialists not only
in bankruptcy law but also, at least in the large cases, in the specific
cases before them. They come to understand the nature of the
business and the far-reaching effects of their decisions much more
clearly than the generalist judge who is forced to focus on a wide
range of disputes.
These attributes of the bankruptcy process might appear to
alleviate some of the concerns regarding institutional competence.
After all, bankruptcy is already an extremely complex, far-reaching
process. Bankruptcy lawyers and judges are expert in multilateral
negotiation and compromise. They are accustomed to dealing with

203. As discussed supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text, this has been the
approach taken in the railroad reorganization setting. See 11 U.S.C. § 1165 (1994)
(requiring the bankruptcy court to consider the interests of the public). This approach has
also been used by various state legislatures in enacting corporate constituency statutes that
authorize directors, and the courts reviewing their conduct, to consider the interests of
various non-shareholder constituencies in evaluating takeover attempts. Jonathan R.
Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of CorporateFiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23,23 (1991).
204. See William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379,
1402 (1994) (discussing public choice problems in bankruptcy legislation).
205. Korobkin attempts to place the burden of determining an optimal bankruptcy
redistributive scheme on the legislature. See Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 19,
at 627-31. This approach is necessary to avoid the intractable problems of indeterminacy
that his redistributive scheme might otherwise entail. But Korobkin fails to provide any
practical means of accomplishing a redistributional scheme that avoids the need for
continued judicial involvement. Elsewhere, Korobkin has analyzed the reconciliation of
conflicting "values" underlying his philosophy as a judicial problem. Korobkin,
Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,supra note 37, at 342-44.
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polycentric problems, and the nature of the process lends itself to
flexible solutions to such problems.
It is natural to believe that an institution capable of resolving
such difficult issues as those presented by the Johns-Manville and
A.H. Robbins 6 Chapter 11 cases is capable of carrying out
redistributive policies. The flaw in such an optimistic view of the
capabilities of the bankruptcy process lies in its assumption that
because judges in the process are capable of resolving the complex
issues raised by the parties to the case, they can also account for the
secondary effects of their decisions. A close examination of the
decisionmaking structure of the process renders that assumption
unwarranted.
2. The Intractable Problem of Representation
An obvious requirement for any redistributive process is that it
provides a voice to those who stand to lose. Not only is representation of such interests required to ensure due process and fundamental fairness, it is also necessary to the formation of rational
policy. Policymakers are not omniscient. They can only respond to
the interests of those asserting injury in the policy-making process.
Only by ensuring adequate representation can the process reach
sensible redistributive outcomes.
Naturally, this observation cuts both ways. Advocates of a
redistributive bankruptcy regime can be taken as pressing this very
point. A creditor-focused view of bankruptcy law excludes interests
of non-investors and prevents the realization of their aims through the
judicial process. Korobkin in particular seems to be making this
argument. Korobkin advocates a theory of bankruptcy that seeks to
ensure that "each person affected by financial distress have threshold
n "
In so
eligibility to press his or her demands in that context
doing, he seeks to avoid what he sees as a flaw in the creditors'

206. The Johns-Manville and A.H. Robbins bankruptcies each involved massive tort

liability of the debtors based on their pre-petition production of asbestos (in the case of
Johns-Manville) and the Dalkon Shield (in the case of A.H. Robbins). The enormously
complex issues encountered in such cases are well analyzed by Mark J.Roe, Bankruptcy
and Mass Tort, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 846 (1984).

207. See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundationsof the Economic
Analysis of Law, 64 NoTRE DAME L. Rv. 817, 833-35 (1989) (noting that the courts
cannot make a sophisticated use of incidence theory).
208. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 19, at 575.
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bargain model's brand of contra.tarianism-its exclusion of categories
of affected persons from the bargain.'
The problem with Korobkin's approach lies in identifying who is
affected by business failure."' 0 At one level, the affected individuals
are easy to identify. Creditors, employees, managers and members of
the community are obviously affected by the failure.21 ' But considering only the interests of these constituencies fails to recognize the
broader impact of bankruptcy decisions on economic decisions made
by individuals unconnected with the firm. Bankruptcy does not
operate in an economic vacuum. The decision to liquidate or to
reorganize the operations of a failed firm implicates allocative
concerns on an economy-wide basis. While liquidation may harm the
community served by the closed enterprise, it212may benefit a distant
community served by a competing enterprise.
While it may be theoretically possible to consider the interests of
such communities, practical difficulties would abound. Assuming that
such communities could be identified, their inclusion in the
bankruptcy process would increase administrative cost. More
importantly, however, such communities would be impossible to
identify fully. In some cases we might find obvious links between the
asset deployment decisions made in a bankruptcy case and the well-

209. Iti at 553-58. Following Rawls, Korobkin places these persons behind a veil of
ignorance as to the actual positions they will occupy vis-a-vis the business enterprise and
each other. Id. at 558-65. Korobkin argues that, bargaining from this equalized position,
these persons would adopt a principal of "rational planning" under which the parties
would resolve conflicting aims by protecting those who are the most vulnerable. Id. at 584.
Korobkin defines "most vulnerable" as those parties occupying the position that provides
the worst prospects for avoiding harm. Id. He carefully limits the effect of his argument
by excluding an automatic right to participate in the process, however, suggesting that
standing decisions should be left to the legislature. Id. at 575 n.162.
210. See Rasmussen, Social Justice, supra note 63, at 12 n.42.
211. Korobkin, Contractarianism,supra note 19, at 574.
212. The communitarian approach to bankruptcy law advocated by Gross is subject to
this difficulty. See Gross, supra note 19. It is not enough to advocate a bankruptcy
process that considers the effect of failure on communities without some basis for defining
the community. The community could be limited to that immediately affected by a
planned closure of the business, but such a limitation would necessarily be artificial.
"[Communitarian values must operate within a community, and the solutions to social
problems are deceptively simple if the affected community is defined too narrowly."
Farber & Matheson, supra note, 150, at 944. But defining a community by reference to
all of the interests affected may well be impossible or is not feasible "because there are
an infinite number of community interests at stake in each bankruptcy and their
boundaries are limitless." Hon. Barry S. Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taking
the Interestsof the Community into Account in Bankruptcy--A Modern-Day Tale ofBelling
the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049, 1051 (1994).
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being of other communities. But, in most cases, important links
between the decisions made in the bankruptcy process and the wealth
of other communities may be too subtle to discernm1
To illustrate and sum up the points made thus far, consider the
vacuum switch manufacturer example from Section III.214 The
question presented by that example is whether the court should allow
the business to invest assets that would otherwise go to creditors to
retool the plant to produce testing devices. Making the investment
over the objections of the creditors can be justified only if: (1) the
creditors are not true residual claimants and therefore put no assets
at risk in the decision; (2) creditors systematically underestimate the
value of such projects; or (3) the court wishes to redistribute wealth
by placing inadequately compensated risk on the creditors for the
benefit of the dependent community. Assuming that the bankruptcy
process allows or requires the court to consider the redistributive
justification, the process should also require the court to consider the
incidence of the redistributive cost. This consideration in turn
requires some means to ensure the representation of parties who
stand to lose from the decision.
Who should have standing to press their claims in such a process?
Obviously the court will hear from the creditors, management, equity
holders and the local community. Should the court also consider the
interests of the current manufacturers of testing equipment? What of
their employees and dependents?
Standing is only one part of the problem. An equally important
question is how the court should balance the interests of the potential
claimants. Perhaps the court could examine other companies in the
testing device industry to determine whether they are making
abnormally high profits. The conclusion to this inquiry might tell the
court something about how the entry of the debtor into this field will
affect the dependents of other firms in the industry.
The inquiry cannot logically stop even here, however. Even if
the court finds abnormally high profits in the vacuum testing industry,
can it then conclude that the community in which the debtor is
213. This problem is not unique to the judicial process. Legislative attempts to devise

standing rules for the bankruptcy process would be subject to the same practical concerns.
Further, the effect of bankruptcy on these far-flung communities is a fact-specific question.
All a legislative body could do would be to provide very generalized standing rules,
effectively leaving most of the decisionmaking power to the courts. Therefore, there is
likely to be no practical way to define and grant standing to all of the persons truly
interested in the failure of the business.
214. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
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operating is the most deserving? The investment in retooling could
preclude a similar investment in a more needy community. Can those
communities be defined and heard in the inquiry? In fact, nothing
about the moral arguments underlying bankruptcy redistributive goals
requires that we stop at national borders in analyzing this question.
Should we consider the possibility that some developing country might
find the vacuum testing industry an attractive investment?215
Finally, what should be the standard for appellate review for this
216
inquiry?
This analysis of the problem might strike some as a little bit
extreme. Perhaps the causal links described here are somewhat
tenuous to draw firm conclusions with respect to standing. Nevertheless, in a given case at least some of the links may exist. While it
might be possible to articulate some means of bracketing the more
tenuous redistributive effects, the bankruptcy process is ill-equipped
even to begin to sort through cases to determine whether the effect
of the process on the well-being of some far-flung community is
deserving of consideration. Furthermore, any limit on the potential
range of the interests presented will be as artificial as the limits
imposed by the creditor wealth-maximization criterion.
3.

The Uncoordinated Nature of Bankruptcy Decisionmaking
The tenuous nature of the causal links between a given
bankruptcy decision and the well-being of distant communities
provides further support for an investor-focused bankruptcy regime.
A second institutional feature of the bankruptcy process that limits its
competence to resolve distributional questions is that bankruptcy
courts act on an uncoordinated basis. The economic effect of
redistributive decisions made by any one bankruptcy judge may be
small in comparison to the aggregate, economy-wide effect of
decisions made by all judges. As illustrated above,217 the way
redistributions occur in bankruptcy is indirect. They occur in large
part through the manipulation of asset deployment decisions and are
carried through to the economy through increases in the cost of
capital.21 This mechanism renders tenuous the causal link between
any one decision and economy-wide effects. The aggregate effect of
all of the redistributive decisions may be significant, however. In this
215.
216.
217.
218.

I thank Barry Cushman for this point.
See Schermer, supra note 212, at 1052.
See supra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
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environment, the uncoordinated decision-making structure of the
bankruptcy process renders it unlikely to yield informed, rational
answers to redistributive issues.
Judges lack any direct means of obtaining information regarding
the aggregate effect of their individual decisions. Judicial fact-finding
by nature is backward looking and decision specific.2 19 Judges do
not look broadly at the direction they and their fellow judges are
taking the economy. Even if judges attempted to develop a sense of
the economy-wide effect of their collective views on bankruptcy
redistributions, it is unlikely that they would have any reliable means
of determining the causal relationship between their individual
redistributive policies and particular economic phenomena. Judges
and the lawyers practicing before them are not necessarily economists
and statisticians. They often lack both the training and the resources
to conduct the analyses required to determine the economic effects of
such decisions.
Even assuming that we could devise some method through which
such information might be disseminated, the uncoordinated decisionmaking approach of the bankruptcy process would remain an
impediment to a rational redistributive policy. If judicial decisions
entail aggregate redistributive effects, it follows that the rationality of
a result in a particular case is necessarily tied to the results of other
cases. Individual judges often lack any means of determining the
views of their colleagues regarding present and future cases, however.
The net effect of judges' uncoordinated decisions may be
redistributions that none of them desired. Consider the plight of a
bankruptcy judge with a vision of the world that incorporates a
balance of wealth and power that favors non-investor interests more
than does the current state of affairs. If authorized to consider the
interests of the community, such a judge might be inclined to skew his
decisionmaking, at least in close cases, toward the continuation of the
business enterprise. But our judge understands that his decisions
entail at least some economy-wide effects and wishes to avoid
dramatic shifts in contractual entitlements that make everyone worse
off, How should such a judge approach cases he believes implicate
redistributive goals?
The judge could simply ignore the economy-wide effects of his
decision and take care of the people and organizations that appear
before him. In limiting his focus, our judge must simply hope that his

219. See supra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
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colleagues share his vision. If other judges do share his vision, he can
take comfort in the fact that, overall, the correct amount of
redistribution is occurring.
Because of the number and diversity of bankruptcy judges,
however, it is likely that his colleagues do not share his exact vision.
Perhaps some are more investor-focused. Should our judge, together
with others of like mind, stick to his guns in an attempt to convince
the others of the error of their ways? Should our judge, together with
others of like mind, increase the amount of redistribution to
counteract the effects of the investor-oriented judges' decisions?
Should our judge, together with others of like mind, capitulate?
The answer depends not only on the judge's commitment to a
particular vision. The answer also depends importantly on the judge's
view of what all of the others will do. Perhaps the investor-focused
judges will capitulate. Perhaps they will redouble their efforts to
ensure that no redistributions will occur. Perhaps those judges who
share the vision of our judge will capitulate. Perhaps they will
overreact and permit redistributions in excess of what our judge
would desire. The complexity of the problem is further compounded
when one realizes that when our judge assesses the views of his
colleagues he must understand that each is also assessing the views of
all of the others.
While judges do have both formal and informal means of
communicating their views, the nature of the problem limits their
ability to express those views clearly.m When a bankruptcy judge
decides to extend exclusivity to protect the community interest, we
know only that the judge believes that the community has some
interest worth protecting. We do not know how the judge views the
redistribution that is occurring. There is no universally understood
language to fully express the judge's view of the odds that the
enterprise will succeed. But understanding this factor is vital to
understanding the judge's own belief as to the level of redistribution
her decisions entail. If the judge views the chances of success as slim,
we might conclude that the judge places a high value on the community's need for protection. If the judge views the chances of
success as good, we can draw no conclusion because we cannot tell

220. Judge Schermer has pointed out that a significant problem with the protection of
the public interest in the bankruptcy process is the lack of an adequate medium to
consider the value of community interests. See Schermer, supra note 212, at 1051-52. This
problem not only affects the decisions of individual judges but also creates difficulties in
coordination between judges.
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what the judge would do with a case in which the chances were not
as good. Even if the judge tells us how she views the chances, we
have a further communication problem-a statement regarding the
chances for success necessarily involves judgments, the bases for which
are largely inarticulable.
Developing a redistributive bankruptcy system thus requires that
we bracket the broad redistributive effects of the regime. The ideal
of representation of all affected persons requires somewhat artificial
limitations based upon our ability to discern the groups affected by
the redistribution. The notion of redistribution must exclude the
aggregate economic effects of the system's outcomes. But the very
justification for such a regime requires that the system account for
these redistributive effects. As stated earlier, support for an inclusive
bankruptcy regime can be found principally in arguments grounded
in distributive justice rather than efficiency. Having determined that
some sacrifice of allocative efficiency is tolerable in the quest to
achieve distributive justice, however, the theorist as well as the
practitioner must confront the question of who will bear the costs.
This point should not be taken too broadly. The attack here is
on the use of the bankruptcy system to achieve redistributive
ends-not on the ends themselves."
Not all institutions are
capable of accomplishing distributional equity. Some touch too many
people in radically unpredictable ways. Bankruptcy is an example.
Its intimate connection with capital markets creates serious information problems that are unlikely to be addressed by its localized and
uncoordinated decisionmaking structure. As a result, the process
cannot hope to satisfy the redistributive goals underlying it.
C. Taxation as an Alternative Method of Achieving Redistributive
Goals
To say that the bankruptcy process is ill-suited to deal with the
practical difficulties raised by redistributive goals is not to say that we
must abandon all hope of achieving such goals. Two broad avenues
exist through which government can attempt to achieve
redistributional goals.m Government can attempt to regulate
economic activity through the prohibition of contractual terms, the
imposition of mandatory terms, or the creation of legal duties.' A
221. I assume for this purpose the general desirability of the ends. See supra notes 13437 and accompanying text.
222. Kronman, supra note 134, at 498-99.
223. Id. at 499.
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bankruptcy structure that incorporates substantial protection for noninvestors could be seen as a species of such a regulatory approach.
An alternative method of redistribution is through the taxation and
social welfare systems -4 Government could address the problems
of business failure through progressive taxation and direct spending
intended to benefit the constituencies affected.
There are several reasons to believe that progressive taxation and
direct governmental assistance, though not without problems, would
provide a more attractive means of redistributing wealth than the
bankruptcy process. Accomplishing redistributions through taxation
and spending has intuitive appeal. The progressive taxation approach
more clearly identifies the group that bears the cost of the
redistributions. Further, spending may be targeted at groups most in
need. Most of the displacement associated with financial distress
presents relatively straightforward problems for those displaced. For
the employee, the first concerns are how to replace the lost wages and
how to pay the bills in the interim. Likewise, communities may be
principally concerned with attracting replacement businesses while
maintaining governmental services during this process. These
parochial concerns present the simple problem of funding. Radical
change of the bankruptcy process is hardly necessary to respond to
the immediate concerns of those affected.
Beyond the intuitive, the use of progressive taxation and
spending to accomplish redistributions avoids the decisionmaking
problems that would plague efforts to use the bankruptcy system to
accomplish such goals. Taxation decisions, at least on the federal
level, can be conducted with an eye toward aggregate economic
effects. Congress, unlike the judiciary, may consider forward-looking
information regarding the broad range of economic effects taxation
and transfer payments may entail.' This approach also avoids the
problems of uncoordinated decisionmaking that would doom efforts
to achieve rational redistributions through the bankruptcy process.2 6
Congress and executive agencies are more likely to have the data and

224. Ld.
225. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:
A New Look at ProgressiveTaxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987) (suggesting models that
tie the rate of progressivity of the tax structure to various theories of distributive justice).
226. See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the
Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REv. 349, 384 (1988). Braucher also believes that
taxes and transfer payments provide more sustained and significant methods of
redistribution. Id. at 383-84.

1995]

BANKRUPTCY LIMITS

the institutional competence to consider the difficult2 questions of the
incidence of redistributive cost than are the courts. In addition to questions of the incidence of redistributive cost we
must also concern ourselves with the absolute level of inefficiency
created by various means of accomplishing redistributions. Of course,
redistributions accomplished through progressive taxation also entail
Taxation creates an incentive for
allocative efficiency losses.'
individuals to substitute leisure for work because they are unable to
reap the full benefits of their earnings. As Kaplow and Shavell have
recently illustrated, however, this substitution effect is present
regardless of whether the redistribution is accomplished through
taxation or through legal rules.229 A bankruptcy redistributive
scheme would therefore entail allocative efficiency losses both through
the substitution effect and through the inefficiency of the rules
themselves.
This call for limiting redistribution to taxation and transfer
payments is not without difficulties. Legislative failures to consider
adequately the need for redistributive policies and the incidence of
their costs are commonplace.20 Public choice problems permeate
taxation legislation and may significantly affect programs designed to
alleviate the displacement accompanying financial failure. The answer
to such problems is not, however, to push the question into another
institution, the structure of which cannot accommodate the policymaking process. While there will be inevitable problems with
legislative solutions to these problems, the approach is less likely to
be doomed to failure from the start.
A final objection to the suggestion that taxation be used in place
of a broad redistributive bankruptcy process is that it attempts to
reduce a complex social and psychological problem to mere dollars.
Taxation does little to alleviate the sense of outrage that may be
experienced by a community that has for years relied on the existence
of a manufacturing concern."2l It does little to alleviate the sense
of loss experienced by the worker who has for years devoted heart

227. Cooter, supra note 207, at 834.
228. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 225, at 1919 ("[P]rogressivity entails a 'trade-off'
between equity and efficiency.").

229. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the

Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD., 667, 667-68 (1994).
230. BeVier cites as an example the effect the 1991 "luxury tax" on yachts had on jobs
in the shipbuilding industry. BeVier, supra note 173, at 11-12.
231. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 19, at 475 (noting that the creditors'

bargain model denies the worth of "public outrage").
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and soul to the enterprise that has suddenly closed due to the "greed"
of the lender. 2 Such problems cannot be addressed adequately by
a simple transfer payment from the federal government.
To such a charge I must plead guilty, but without apology.
Governmental transfer payments do not fully compensate for the loss
experienced by non-investors. But whether we like it or not,
protecting non-investor interests upon business failure comes only at
a cost measured in dollars and paid by someone. In our zeal to
protect the people hurt by business failure we must remember to take
care not to harm another equally vulnerable group.
CONCLUSION

As Warren has so aptly noted, "Bankruptcy policy debates suffer
enough from communication problems." 3 Academic debate over
the appropriate limits of the bankruptcy process seems to occur in two
worlds that collide only rarely. Economic theorists' preoccupation
with allocational efficiency and critics' obsession with theories of
justice and community, while valuable additions to the debate, have
obscured a fundamental point-bankruptcy is but a small part of a
vast economic system.
It is not my intention to denigrate the importance of bankruptcy
law, however. Bankruptcy outcomes are critical in defining the risks
involved in capital formation. But the power of the process is also
the source of its limitations. The bankruptcy system has an enormous
potential to affect the risk relationships that define business
The question is whether that power can be
enterprises.
controlled.'
This Article contends that the bankruptcy judiciary does not and
cannot control that power. Control requires understanding. It also
requires institutions that can assimilate information in a way that
allows rational action based on that information. The institutional
structure of the bankruptcy process renders it unable to develop the
kind of detailed understanding necessary to formulate a rational
232. Korobkin, Jurisprudence,supra note 19, at 763 (pointing out that "[m]anagement,
employees, and shareholders may view the corporation, in various contexts, as an
extension of their own natures").
233. Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 19, at 338.
234. As one commentator noted, "[Consequences which are intended or which seem
to follow from some provision in the law are often revealed to be frustrated when we look
at bankruptcy not in isolation but as part of a larger system." William H. Meckling,
FinancialMarkets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 17 (1977).
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redistributive policy or to act on that information in a uniform
manner.
Admittedly, the arguments presented here raise empirical
questions regarding the effect of bankruptcy decisions on an economywide basis. It is possible that the effects of a redistributive
bankruptcy policy may be susceptible to falsification by empirical
data. But it is also possible that many of the redistributions occurring
under such a regime may be too subtle to admit of rigorous scientific
analysis. 5 At the very least, we must view with skepticism
conclusions drawn from empirical studies that ignore the effect of the
regime on constituencies beyond those connected with the firms under
study. While they may tell of the beneficial or detrimental effects of
the process on those immediately affected, they can say little
regarding the overall distributional effect of the regime.
Normative analysis, of course, occupies a critical place in policy
debates. Economic theory alone cannot provide a complete answer
to those who question its normative underpinnings. As the development of the bankruptcy debate illustrates, we will continue to debate
the normative trade-off between equality and efficiency.
Policymakers must deal with the art of the possible, however. Given
the practical limitations of the bankruptcy process, we should engage
the normative debate in the context of other institutions.

235. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searchingfor Reorganization
Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1281-82 (1994) (identifying some of the difficulties with
conducting empirical research into these types of problems).

